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CRIME IN NEW ORLEANS: ANALYZING CRIME TRENDS AND NEW ORLEANS' RESPONSES TO CRIME

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INTRODUCTION

This report is a comprehensive analysis of crime in New Orleans and the efforts of the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) to respond to that crime. Funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) of the U.S. Department of Justice, this involved the collection and analysis of crime data, in addition to interviews with command staff, civilian staff, district personnel, and representatives of the Office of the District Attorney and the Office of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana. We attended district and central Comstat meetings. Collection of data for this effort took place between August 8 and December 21 of 2010. Throughout our work, we received complete cooperation from the NOPD and related agencies. All information that we requested was promptly provided.

Based on our initial analysis of crime in New Orleans, we anticipated that one of our tasks would be to suggest new initiatives that have been proven effective in addressing similar crime problems that the NOPD should consider adopting. This task fundamentally changed on our first day in New Orleans when the Superintendent released a 65-point plan to “rebuild the NOPD.”¹ This plan included the initiation and/or enhancement of a series of crime-fighting efforts that have been identified as being successful in other cities. Subsequent actions of the NOPD have further refined this effort and added new specificity to this impressive plan. While our report will still suggest some new additional initiatives that the NOPD should consider, our focus will be on how to further the effectiveness of those efforts already announced by the department. It is important to make sure this plan is properly implemented and tailored to the specific problems facing New Orleans.

In a related effort, BJA created a team of subject-matter experts to assess the homicide investigation resources, policies, and practices of the NOPD. In their report,² they make the obvious but important point that the devastation associated with Hurricane Katrina and the resulting impact on the city and the NOPD permeate any understanding of contemporary crime and justice in New Orleans. That report documents the implications of Katrina for the NOPD and will not be repeated here (see pages 1–4). Rather, our approach will be on things as they exist in late 2010 and how the NOPD can contribute to the continuing return of New Orleans to the vibrant city it has been for more than 200 years.

PUTTING NEW ORLEANS' CRIME IN CONTEXT: NATIONALLY AND HISTORICALLY


In a 2010 poll conducted by the Kaiser Foundation, citizens of New Orleans recently indicated that crime was the most serious problem facing the city—crime as a more serious problem than the economy, unemployment, health care, housing, or any other problem. A review of the New Orleans newspapers during the past few months reinforces this perception. But how does New Orleans compare to the nation, similar-sized cities, and cities with similar

¹ See “Rebuilding the New Orleans Police Department—First Steps,” August 23, 2010. New Orleans Police Department public document.

² “An Assessment of the New Orleans Police Department Homicide Section,” available from BJA.

characteristics? We know too well the difficulties of comparing crime rates in the United States. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) makes these difficulties clear and prominent in its yearly report on crime in the United States. Still the question needs to be considered, even if we must always nuance our conclusions—what does crime in New Orleans look like compared to other cities, and how does crime in New Orleans today compare to crime in New Orleans in the recent past. We try to answer these questions, recognizing the tentative nature of any comparative conclusions, but knowing from our consideration of other cities that a successful response to crime will be based on a thorough analysis of available crime data.³

Chart 1. Total Crime Rates, 2009



Source: *Crime in the United States (Uniform Crime Reports), 2009*

Chart 1 presents crime data for the most recent year available from the FBI for New Orleans, the United States as a whole, all cities the size of New Orleans, and one specific city that is similar to New Orleans in size, region of the country, and level of tourism and entertainment-based economy (Orlando, Florida).⁴ The total crime rate in 2009 for the nation was 3,466 index crimes per 100,000 population; for cities 250,000 to 499,999, the rate was 5,119; for New Orleans 4,623, and for Orlando 8,579.⁵ For total crime rates, New Orleans has a higher rate than the nation, a comparable rate to similar-sized cities, and a much lower rate than Orlando.⁶


³ We were not able to do a comprehensive audit of crime data in New Orleans. While there is nothing that we have seen to call into question the reliability and validity of NOPD crime data, we think it prudent for the department to arrange for an independent audit of its data so that future analyses and the public will know if there are problems that need to be addressed.

⁴ Of course, we recognize that no city is truly comparable to New Orleans, especially after Hurricane Katrina. Still, we think such benchmarking is important and could be done by the NOPD in the future.

⁵ Index crimes are murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny above \$500, and auto theft. For these crimes, police departments report crimes known to police. These are used to estimate the level in crime and changes in crime in the nation.

⁶ Population estimates are taken from the Uniform Crime Reports and may have been impacted by the population shifts during and after Hurricane Katrina. Furthermore, rates for areas with high tourist populations may


Chart 2. Violent Crime Rates, 2009



Source: *Crime in the United States (Uniform Crime Reports), 2009*

Chart 2 presents the data for violent crimes. The rate for the nation is 429; for cities similar in size to New Orleans, 805; for New Orleans, 777; and for Orlando, 1,197. For violent crimes, the rate in New Orleans is higher than the rate for the nation and similar to comparable-sized cities but substantially lower than the rate for Orlando.⁷

Chart 3. Property Crime Rates, 2009



Source: *Crime in the United States (Uniform Crime Reports), 2009*


underestimate denominator counts. Research does strongly suggest that tourists have lower rates of crime while on vacation than they experience in their residential areas (Wellford, 1997).

⁷ This pattern holds for the individual violent crimes (rape, aggravated assault and robbery).

Chart 3 presents the data for property crimes. The rate for the nation is 3,036; for New Orleans, 3,846; for cities similar in size to New Orleans, 4,313; and for Orlando, 7,383. For property crimes, the rate in New Orleans is higher than the rate for the nation but lower than the rate for comparable-sized cities and Orlando.

Considering total, violent, and property crime, it is accurate to conclude that the crime problem in New Orleans is more serious than it is for the nation as a whole. This is not unexpected for a variety of reasons, as urban areas have higher crime rates than rural areas, and the national rate reflects the combination of these two rates. The rate of crime in New Orleans is lower than it is for comparable cities for total, violent, and property crime.

Chart 4. Homicide Rates, 2009



Source: *Crime in the United States (Uniform Crime Reports), 2009*

Chart 4 contains the data on one type of violent crime, namely homicide. As is obvious, the homicide rate in New Orleans is substantially higher than the rate in the nation, comparable-sized cities, or Orlando. In 2009, the rate of homicide in New Orleans was more than 10 times the national average and more than 4 times the rate for cities of a similar size and the rate of Orlando. By any measure, the rate of homicide is considerably higher than it is for any comparison category. While the rate of homicide in New Orleans is a serious problem in 2009 and continues to be so in 2010, it is important to place this issue in the context of the recent past of New Orleans.





Chart 5 presents the rate of homicide in New Orleans for the period 1985 to 2009. During this period, the rate of homicide grew steadily, peaking in 1994 when the rate reached a level of approximately 85 per 100,000. It then began a decline to a period low rate of 33, after which it began to gradually increase until 2005. Since 2005, the rate has fluctuated between period lows and the period high in 2007. The rate has declined each year since 2007. However, comparing rates in New Orleans since 2005 presents a problem, given the instability and uncertainty of estimates of the city's true population. The impact of Hurricane Katrina has resulted in varying estimates of residents and visitors to the city. This variation can distort rates of homicide by over- or understating the size of the denominator. Chart 6 presents the data on the number of homicides for this same period. Focusing on the years since Katrina, we note that in 2007 the number of homicides was 209. This number declined in 2008 to 179 and then to 174 in 2009. The total count of homicides in 2010 was 175. As the population in New Orleans has

been increasing by 50,000 to 100,000 per year in this period, the decline in homicides is encouraging, but the number and our best estimate of rates clearly demonstrate that homicides in New Orleans are abnormally high.

In summary, the citizens of New Orleans are right in identifying crime as a serious problem facing their city. However, it is not crime in general, property crime, or even total violent crime that is the problem. The crime problem facing New Orleans is the problem of homicide; rates for other types of serious crime are comparable to or lower than the rates for similarly situated cities.⁸

PATTERNS OF CRIMINAL HOMICIDE IN NEW ORLEANS: 2009–2010

Efforts to reduce homicides in a jurisdiction most often begin with a careful consideration of the nature of homicides in that jurisdiction. These reviews are to identify the characteristics of the homicides, including their location, that suggest interventions that are expected to reduce homicides. Following this approach, we examined 200 recent criminal homicides in New Orleans (occurring from April 18, 2009, to May 11, 2010). Information was collected from multiple sources, such as paper case folders, electronic management systems, and narrative reports prepared by detectives. The result was an extensive database with detailed case characteristics, victimology, offender, and spatial variables.⁹ In the following, we describe many of these variables and touch on the possible nature of homicide in New Orleans during this period of time.

Case Characteristics

Nearly 61 percent of the homicides we examined occurred in 2009 (Table 1). Only one case occurred outside of the year, and it was determined to be a homicide—one case ruled as homicide in 2010 was based on an incident from 1996. The most common time for a homicide was between 8:00 p.m. and 12:00 Midnight; with 39 percent of cases in this period, even the next two largest categories added together do not match the 8:00 p.m. to 12:00 Midnight group. There is a more even distribution across the day of the week, though clearly most homicides occur over the weekend and on Thursdays. This is somewhat different from the pattern that we saw in NOPD's final 2010 report, which showed most homicides on Sundays and Mondays for all 2010 incidents.

⁸ This is not to minimize the impact that any crime has on the victim, their family, friends and associates, and the community. From the point of view of the victim and the community, every crime is serious.

⁹ Even more detailed analysis would be helpful to better understand victim/offender relationships and characteristics of the homicide. As the NOPD develops its crime analysis capabilities (discussed later), this should be considered.

Table 1. Homicides by Year Ruled, Time, and Day of Week

<i>Year</i>	<i>Count</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
2009	121	60.5
2010	79	39.5
TOTAL	200	100.0
<i>Time</i>	<i>Count</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
12:00 Midnight – 4:00 a.m.	27	13.5
4:00 a.m. – 8:00 a.m.	10	5.0
8:00 a.m. – 12:00 Noon	14	7.0
12:00 Noon – 4 p.m.	35	17.5
4:00 p.m. – 8:00 p.m.	36	18.0
8:00 p.m. – 12:00 Midnight	78	39.0
TOTAL	200	100.0
<i>Day of Week</i>	<i>Count</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Sunday	37	18.5
Monday	24	12.0
Tuesday	23	11.5
Wednesday	25	12.5
Thursday	35	17.5
Friday	20	10.0
Saturday	36	18.0
TOTAL	200	100.0

As seen in Table 2, most incidents took place in some form of residence or residential area. Three of the four most common locations represent residential space, with 59 percent of cases taking place at either a Single-Family Dwelling, a Multi-Family Dwelling, or a Residential Area (typically outside in a residential neighborhood). This finding is important, because it suggests most homicides will have witnesses who live in the area of the killings; of course, this does not ensure cooperation, but it does emphasize the importance of citizen witnesses. Most homicides are not happening in the shadows but, rather, in front of people’s homes where witnesses exist and can make a difference for their own communities, if they so choose.

Other location types are relatively rare in comparison to residential areas, with a Vehicle, the Victim’s Vehicle, a Bar/Tavern/Nightclub, and Commercial Areas accounting for nearly 21 percent of locations across just four categories. Other location types, such as Gas Stations and Restaurants, are even rarer in the data. These locations are similar in that these areas reflect a victim who is away from home and has possibly been intercepted by an offender.

Less than 10 percent of cases occurred in places that seem to suggest a high degree of secrecy with limited potential for witnesses, such as an Alley, a Vacant Building/Lot, or Wooded Area.

Table 2. Location Type

<i>Location</i>	<i>Count</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Alley	4	2.0
Bar/Tavern/Nightclub	7	3.5
Bus/Bus Stop/Bus Station	1	0.5
Commercial Area	7	3.5
Gas Station	1	0.5
Grocery Store/Market	1	0.5
Jail	1	0.5
Motel/Hotel	5	2.5
Multi-Family Dwelling (apartment, etc.)	19	9.5
Parking Lot/Garage	1	0.5
Residential Area	54	27.0
Restaurant	1	0.5
Road—Paved/Public	5	2.5
Sidewalk	2	1.0
Single-Family Dwelling	45	22.5
Taxi	2	1.0
Unknown	2	1.0
Vacant Building	10	5.0
Vacant Lot	3	1.5
Vehicle	7	3.5
Victim's Vehicle	20	10.0
Wooded Area/Forest	2	1.0
TOTAL	200	100.0

The findings from Table 2 can be coupled with Table 3, which shows that nearly 75 percent of incidents in these data happened outdoors. This fact also highlights the importance of witnesses to come forward; the most common homicide is going to be in a residential area and outside, neither of which provides much privacy but also serves to endanger people other than the victim.

Table 3. Indoors/Outdoors

<i>Area</i>	<i>Count</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Indoors	51	25.5
Outdoors	149	74.5
TOTAL	200	100.0

Unsurprisingly, the most common weapon used in the homicides studied was a handgun, composing 78 percent of all cases. Nearly all homicides (89 percent) can be accounted for if one adds the count for all firearms (handguns, rifles, shotguns, etc.), as seen in Table 4. Following firearms, stabbings and blunt force trauma were the most common and together made up 8 percent of all incidents.

Table 4. Method of Homicide

<i>Method</i>	<i>Count</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Arson/Fire/Accelerant	2	1.0
Blunt Force Trauma	7	3.5
Firearm (Handgun)	156	78.0
Firearm (Rifle)	16	8.0
Firearm (Shotgun)	5	2.5
Firearm (Unknown)	3	1.5
Knife/Stabbing/Cutting Weapon	9	4.5
Strangulation	1	0.5
Unknown	1	0.5
TOTAL	200	100.0

In Table 5, we list multiple measurements of motive. The first category, Motive Official, took data from the master spreadsheet of homicides maintained by the Homicide Unit. The other three categories, Factors A, B, and C, were determined from a reading of the case materials. We offer these to emphasize that homicides are not simple events that can be explained by one characteristic. It is important to understand the complexity of these events in order to develop effective programs to reduce homicide levels. These are best thought of as motivational factors, in which multiple factors can be at play in a single homicide. In fact, more than half of the reviewed cases were found to contain more than one factor, suggesting additional complexity in determining an offender's motive. Of course, the ordering of the importance of these factors is a judgment most likely best made after the investigation is complete. The data in Table 5 is our best estimate based on our reading of the narrative in the homicide files.

The most common official motive was the Drug-Related label, with nearly 29 percent of the total. Closely following this were Revenge killings at almost 24 percent, and Argument/Conflict represented about 19 percent of incidents. Unknown motives and robberies were the only other categories with 10 percent or greater, and domestic killings accounted for less than 6 percent of cases.

Factors we coded from the narratives indicated relatively similar findings, with the most common factors being the same as the official motive. Generally, Argument/Conflict is most common, followed by Revenge and then Drug-Related killings among each factor. Most common in Factor A, however, is Unclear. It is important to note that Unclear is distinct from Unknown. While cases with Unknown motive generally have little to work with and few leads, Unclear cases can have multiple competing pathways that lead to potentially different suspects. Unclear cases often have leads but simply not enough to lock in on a specific history or offender at the time of review. Also, in a number of cases, Unclear was selected as Factor A, due to case information or narratives with sparse details that would prevent an outside reviewer from determining fully what occurred in the case.

Table 5. Motives

<i>Motive Official</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Factor A</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Factor B</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Factor C</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Argument/Conflict	18.5	Argument/Conflict	15.5	Argument/Conflict	15.5	Argument/Conflict	6.5
Burglary	0.5	Burglary	0.5	Burglary	4.5	Crime Concealment	1.0
Domestic	5.5	Carjacking	0.5	Contract	0.5	Domestic	1.0
Drug-Related	28.5	Domestic	4.5	Debt	1.5	Drive-by Shooting	0.5
Mistaken ID	0.5	Drive-By Shooting	0.5	Domestic	1.5	Drug-Related	8.0
Rape	0.5	Drug-Related	8.0	Drive-By Shooting	2.5	Gang-Related	2.5
Revenge	23.5	Home Invasion	4.0	Drug-Related	11.0	Jealousy	1.0
Robbery	10.0	Mistaken ID	0.5	Gang-Related	1.5	Revenge	8.0
Unknown	12.5	Revenge	11.5	Home Invasion	1.0	Robbery	4.5
		Robbery	5.0	Jealousy	1.5	None	67.0
		Sexual Motivation	0.5	Mistaken ID	0.5		
		Unclear	37.5	Revenge	14.5		
		Unintended Target	1.5	Robbery	4.0		
		Unknown	9.5	Self-Defense	0.5		
		Witness Elimination	0.5	Thrill/Amusement	0.5		
				Unintended Target	1.0		
				Witness Elimination	1.5		
				None	36.5		
	100.0		100.0		100.0		100.0


The final case characteristic we report on is the clearance rate and details, as seen in Table 6. Our data, which span across parts of two distinct years, show a clearance rate of 51 percent, or in other words 102 out of the 200 homicide cases reviewed. Most of these cases were cleared by arrest (more than 93 percent of clearances), with only five cases cleared by the death of the known suspect. This clearance rate generated from a sample of 200 consecutive cases is similar to recent yearly rates reported by the department.

Table 6. Clearances and Closure Details

<i>Cleared?</i>	<i>Count</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
No	98	49.0
Yes	102	51.0
Of those cleared, how?		
Arrest	95	93.1
Demise of suspect	5	4.9
Suspect already incarcerated	1	1.0
Warrant issued	1	1.0
TOTAL	200	100.0

Victimology

This section describes characteristics of homicide victims. Chart 7 shows the victim's age at the time of the incident. The majority of victims were young, with more than 50 percent being 27 years old or younger at death. This is not surprising, given other research and data that suggest that a younger demographic is generally more at risk for homicide victimization. In our data, we were missing age data for seven cases in which the date of birth/age was in question or undetermined/unrecorded in the case jacket.



Additionally, as seen in Table 7, most victims were black males. However, only 1 percent of victims had a listed gang/crew affiliation within the homicide file. It is possible that such a finding is lower than the reality, especially with the transient and temporary allegiances found in most urban, neighborhood-based street gangs. This finding may be more suggestive of the type of gangs/crews found in New Orleans—loose organizations without formal leadership structures. Of course, this would not be to say that strongly organized and hierarchical criminal operations cannot exist, but this finding suggests that at least among homicide victims, these operations are either uninvolved or likely linked to groups with periodic and fluid membership such that intelligence would be far harder to come by.¹⁰ Finally, we took note, when possible, of the victim’s employment. A plurality of victims were noted in the homicide file as having no gainful employment (46 percent), whereas nearly only 24 percent had a listed job/occupation and no determination was noted for the remaining 30 percent of cases.


Table 7. Victim Gender, Race, Gang, and Employment Status

	<i>Count</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Gender		
Male	173	86.5
Female	26	13.0
Transgender	1	0.5
Race		
Asian	2	1.0
Black	183	91.5
Hispanic	4	2.0
White	10	5.0
Other	1	0.5
Gang/Crew Involvement		
Yes	2	1.0
No	198	99.0
Employment		
Yes	48	24.0
No	92	46.0
Unknown	60	30.0

Chart 8 shows the number of contacts with police among victims. We use the term “contacts” rather than “arrests,” because we sought to include offenses that did not lead to a formal arrest; the issue of importance is how many times an individual was in contact with law enforcement such that an official record of any kind was created. While the single-largest number of contacts among victims was zero (27 percent), the vast majority of victims had at least one previous formal contact with police before being killed (73 percent). Since a numeric average number of contacts would be misleading due to the few individuals with significantly

¹⁰ The issue of gangs came up in a number of our interviews. The consensus we observed was best expressed as follows by a member of the NOPD: “We learned that the city does in fact have criminal gangs operating here. The point that needs to be stressed is that they are not the traditional structured gangs that are seen in other cities. They are groups of individuals that identify themselves with the area in which they live and often create names for their group. Sometimes these groups are as small as three to four individuals.”

larger values, the median is most useful to summarize the data. The median for victim contacts is eight, meaning that 50 percent of victims had less than eight contacts and 50 percent of victims had more than eight contacts. Four cases did not have clear information as to the number of contacts, though there was information in the file about a prior arrest or being on probation; these cases were not included in Chart 8.



Among those victims with police contacts, Table 8 shows more detail as to the nature of the criminal histories. We catalogued whether victims had a violent, property, drug, or firearm crime in their history. These categories are not mutually exclusive, meaning that a single victim could have all, none, or any combination. For example, if a victim were to have an assault with gun and marijuana arrest, that would fulfill the violent, drug, and firearm categories. The purpose is to give a more qualitative insight as to the nature of the various police contacts. As seen in Table 8, well over 50 percent of all victims with at least one police contact (N=146, or 73 percent of the all victims) had a prior violent or property offense. Over two-thirds of victims with a criminal record had a drug offense, while two-fifths had a prior firearms offense on their record.

Table 8. Victim Criminal History

	<i>Count</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Criminal History?		
Yes	146	73.0
No	54	27.0
Of those with history...		
Violent priors	85	58.2
Property priors	80	54.8
Drug priors	99	67.8
Firearms priors	59	40.4

For all cleared cases (N=102), we recorded the victim's relationship to the offender. We limited ourselves to cleared cases in order to have greater certainty in the results. Table 9 shows that more than 40 percent of cleared cases involved an offender who was the victim's acquaintance. Acquaintance is the largest response category, with the next largest, Other, accounting for almost 16 percent and Stranger totaling almost 14 percent of cleared cases. The Other category is a mix of relationships that do not fit well into other relationships; for example, one relationship given an Other categorization was recorded as "Former friends," while a different case had "Suspect was relative of individual who Decedent had numerous physical fights with." These relationships are generally united by the victim and offender knowing one another, often as more than mere acquaintances but less formally as friends. The vast majority of victims seemed to know their killers in some way, at least in cleared cases. While it is possible that open cases have a higher proportion of stranger homicides (and thus are harder to solve), a reading of the totality of cases suggests that these proportions of victim-offender relationships are possibly similar for the whole sample.

Table 9. Victim's Relationship to Known Offender

<i>Relationship</i>	<i>Count</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Acquaintance	41	40.2
Boyfriend/Girlfriend	4	3.9
Classmate	1	1.0
Co-Worker	1	1.0
Ex-Spouse	1	1.0
Friend	6	5.9
Other	16	15.7
Parent/Guardian	1	1.0
Prisoner	1	1.0
Relative	1	1.0
Rival (Unclear)	1	1.0
Rival Drug Dealers	4	3.9
Spouse	2	2.0
Stranger	14	13.7
Unclear	5	4.9
Unknown	3	2.9
	102	100.0


Offenders

Taking the 102 cleared homicide cases in our data, we examined the various characteristics of the known first offender. By "first offender," we have limited the analysis to simply the first individual listed in charging documents. Since only about 20 percent of all cases have multiple offenders recorded, using this first offender as primary should present a reasonable picture of offender characteristics.¹¹ Of note, from the 102 cleared cases with a first offender, 13

¹¹ Detailed data was not always available for other offenders identified in the file. In future analysis, the NOPD should gather complete information on these offenders.

individuals are responsible for multiple homicides (most often, a single offender in a double or triple homicide). While the number of those charged is fewer than the number of incidents with a charge, we will conduct the analysis using the full 102 cleared incidents. We are interested in offender characteristics within the context of the incident—in other words, if a 78-year-old was responsible for a triple homicide, then we feel it is most accurate from an incident-based perspective to present three murders by that individual rather than to treat all offenders uniformly (i.e., a triple murderer is given the same weight in the analysis as an offender who killed only one person).

In Chart 9, we display the offender's age at the time of the incident. The majority of known offenders are even younger than victims, with more than 50 percent being 23 years old or younger at the time of the incident. Note that there are large age gaps in the graph roughly beyond 30 years old—the ages with zero counts were removed for easy reading and since this formulation expresses the same concept, namely that older offenders are outliers in the data.




As seen in Table 10, most offenders were black males. In fact, based on the data and these cleared cases, the first known offender is almost exclusively a black male. Like victims, very few offenders had a recorded gang/crew affiliation within the homicide file (nearly 3 percent of offenders). As with victims, it is possible such a figure is lower than the reality for numerous possible reasons mentioned previously. Finally, the majority of known offenders were noted in the homicide file as having no gainful employment (nearly 56 percent), whereas only about 17 percent had a listed job/occupation and no determination was noted for the remaining 27 percent of cleared cases.

Table 10. Known First Offender’s Gender, Race, Gang, and Employment Status (N=102)

	<i>Count</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Gender		
Male	97	95.1
Female	5	4.9
Race		
Asian	1	1.0
Black	99	97.1
Hispanic	1	1.0
White	1	1.0
Gang/Crew Involvement		
Yes	3	2.9
No	99	97.1
Employment		
Yes	17	16.7
No	57	55.9
Unknown	27	26.5

Chart 10 shows the number of contacts with police among offenders. Again, we use the term “contacts” rather than “arrests” because we sought to include offenses that likely did not lead to a formal arrest. Like victims, the single-largest number of contacts among offenders was zero (nearly 14 percent); however, this indicates that an even larger proportion of known first offenders in cleared cases had some type of criminal history (more than 83 percent). The median for offender contacts is 10, meaning that 50 percent of offenders had less than 10 contacts and 50 percent of offenders had more than 10 contacts; this value is also higher than victims, suggesting that (at least among those known to police) offenders typically have larger criminal records. Three cases did not have clear information as to whether the offender had any criminal history; these cases were not included in Chart 10.



Among those known offenders with police contacts, Table 11 shows more detail as to the nature of the criminal histories. Like victims, more than 50 percent of all offenders with at least one police contact (N=85) had a prior violent or property offense. In fact, violent offenses are the most common in offender histories, whereas drug offenses were most common in victims; among these known offenders, less than 58 percent had a drug offense, compared to more than 67 percent of victims. Finally, about the same proportion of offenders as victims had a prior firearms arrest (more than 41 percent of known offenders).

Table 11. Offender Criminal History

	<i>Count</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Criminal History?		
Yes	85	83.3
No	14	13.7
Unknown	3	2.9
Of those with history...		
Violent priors	50	58.8
Property priors	47	55.3
Drug Priors	49	57.6
Firearms priors	35	41.2

Spatial

We examined three spatial components—the incident location, the victim’s last known address, and the first offender’s last known address. As seen in Figure 1, there seems to be considerable overlap between those three elements (incidents marked as red, victim’s home as green, and offender’s home as blue) across our 200 reviewed cases.

Figure 1. Incident, Victim, and Known First Offender Addresses



Given the relative rarity of homicides as compared to other crime, we have used the district as our spatial unit; smaller units would have low incident counts and would not be as helpful in examining larger-scale trends in the city. Table 12 summarizes the homicide counts by district.

Table 12. Count of Incidents/Victim/Offender Addresses and Clearances, by District

<i>District</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Victims</i>	<i>Offenders</i>	<i>Cleared Cases</i>
1	42	29	13	20
2	18	19	8	6
3	17	16	12	6
4	19	19	9	8
5	50	44	19	28
6	18	20	9	12
7	33	33	20	20
8	3	2	1	2
TOTAL	200	182	91	102

Figure 2. Incident Locations (N=200)






Figure 3. Incident Locations, by District (N=200)



In Figure 2, we geocoded our 200 incident addresses. Most addresses were matched automatically by an address locator and then reviewed for accuracy, while unmatched addresses were linked manually. In most cases, an exact address was available to match; however, approximately 15 incident locations were listed in the “block of” (e.g., 3000 B/O Second Street). In those cases, the link was made to the start of the block, such that 3000 B/O Second Street would be matched to 3000 Second Street, for the purposes of these maps. From a visual review of these limited cases, the positioning of the match at the start of a block rather than the middle or elsewhere on the block did not impact any of the results in this analysis.

Figure 3 summarizes the incident counts. As can be seen numerically in Table 12, the First and Fifth Districts have the highest incident counts, and the Seventh District the next highest. In this map, the divide is clear between those three districts with large numbers and the five remaining districts. No district falls within the 21–30 count range, marking a boundary between these two groups. The Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Districts are all in the same category and, as seen in Table 12, are nearly identical in counts.

Figure 4. Percentage of Cases Cleared, by District (N=102)



Given this distribution and given the previously discussed data on clearance, we examined clearances by district. Figure 4 maps the percentage of cleared cases. Earlier, we saw that the overall clearance rate across the 200 cases was consistent with previous yearly values. When these clearances are mapped, there is slightly more variability. In Figure 4, we summarized the clearance rate by district. The First and Fifth Districts had clearance rates slightly below and above the overall clearance value, with 47 percent and 56 percent cleared, respectively. Given that these districts account for nearly one-half of all homicide incidents, those district clearance rates likely drive the overall value. Interestingly, the four districts with similar incident counts had considerable clearance rate variation. The Second and Third had the lowest rates, while the Sixth had the highest rates.

Figure 5. Victim Addresses (N=182)





Figure 6. Victim Addresses, by District (N=182)



Figures 5 and 6 map the victim's last known address. For these maps, the total number of cases is 182: 16 cases had victims from outside of New Orleans, and 2 cases had homeless/unknown address for the victim. The distribution of victims is relatively similar to the spatial distribution of incidents.

Figure 7. Known First Offender Addresses (N=91)





Figure 8. Known First Offender Addresses, by District (N=91)



The final two spatial figures show data for 91 known first-listed offenders (the remaining 11 offenders either had addresses outside of New Orleans or were homeless at the time). The scale for the Figure 8 legend was proportionately reduced in order to better represent the distribution given the lower sample size (91 as opposed to 200 or 182 in the previous address maps). From this, one can see a different distribution among known offenders than in either incidents or victim addresses—while the First and Fifth Districts yield high values across all maps, a sizable chunk of known offenders came from the Seventh District, as well as other less active districts.

Summary

Homicides in New Orleans, as we have found in other cities, are highly concentrated geographically. The victims and perpetrators of homicides are young, African-American males with criminal records. They are disproportionately unemployed. Homicides are primarily committed with firearms and occur mainly in Districts 1 and 5. The victims and offenders are overwhelmingly residents of New Orleans. What appear to be different about homicides in New Orleans are the circumstances of the events—they are in residential areas and outdoors and do not involve the kinds of drug and gang involvements found in other cities. In reading the narratives of the offenses, one is struck by their ordinariness—arguments and disputes that escalate into homicide. In cities where the homicide levels are very much driven by gang activity, the police have a way to focus their efforts—disrupt and redirect the gangs. Where drug markets drive the crime, the police can similarly address homicide by targeting drug distribution systems. Gangs and organized drug markets appear to play less of a role in homicides in New Orleans than they do in other cities. This is not to say that a focus on drug law enforcement and on the types of gangs that do exist in New Orleans will not help reduce homicides but rather that these strategies must be accompanied by other strategies that are tailored to the nature of homicide in New Orleans.

These additional approaches must be focused on a high homicide-rate area and on known offenders who are likely to commit homicide and should actively engage the affected communities in the suppression of homicides and their solution. We will say more about geographical and known offender targeting later. Engaging affected communities may be the most important and difficult of these approaches. Obviously, since Hurricane Katrina, the city has witnessed a series of arrests and convictions of police officers that undermined trust, especially in minority communities. Regaining and expanding that trust will be important to gain the communities' support in reducing homicides and in their assistance in raising homicide clearance rates to higher levels. It is encouraging to note that the preamble to the NOPD plan to rebuild the department begins with a commitment to community policing, with ten principles that lay the foundation for achieving community respect and collaboration to address community problems. The nature of homicide in New Orleans suggests this may be the most important part of the plan to reduce homicides.

IMPLEMENTING THE NEW ORLEANS PLAN TO REDUCE HOMICIDES

As noted earlier, on August 23, 2010, the Superintendent released a 65-point plan to rebuild the NOPD. Included in that plan was a series of steps that were aimed at reducing violent crime. These initiatives included most of what we would have recommended to the department if they had not already been adopted. These are strategies and practices that have proven effective in other cities which have sought to reduce criminal homicides and violence. These include (1) Project Safe Neighborhoods, (2) Code 6, (3) Violent Crime Abatement Teams, (4) knock-and-talk, (5) crime laboratory enhancements, and (6) staffing and deployment.¹² As these are already in various stages of implementation, we have sought to understand how they are operating and what steps might be taken next to further enhance their effectiveness. In addition, our review has determined that the department should consider the following additional efforts: (1) establish a homicide review team, (2) make improvements to crime analysis and intelligence operations, and (3) devote greater attention to community collaboration. In the remainder of this section, we will discuss each of the recently launched efforts and our suggestions for additional efforts that respond to the characteristics of homicides in New Orleans.

Project Safe Neighborhoods¹³

On June 10, 2010, the NOPD created and staffed a Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) detective in each district and also placed one in the Special Operations Division. Working with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and other federal agencies, the PSN detectives are responsible for conducting follow-up on every firearm-related arrest in the city. Each week, the PSN detectives meet with the District Attorney, the United States Attorney, and members of other federal agencies to review gun cases and other cases that have been designated

¹² In addition, there are narcotics and crime task forces in each district. We were not able to review them in detail as they were just being launched during our visits.

¹³ Professor Edward McGarrell, the national evaluator for PSN, assisted the team with this section of the report following a site visit to New Orleans in December 2010.

high priority in each district. The effort is to make sure that these cases get high priority in investigations, at bond hearings, in prosecution, and at sentencing. Appropriate cases are considered for prosecution in the federal system. PSN has proven to be very effective in other cities. The strength of the New Orleans PSN program appears to be the focused attention on gun offenders and the most serious gun offenders in particular. Increasing the risk of arrest and prosecution for illegal gun carrying and gun crime is the first step toward changing the street culture in terms of chronic offenders' routine possession and carrying of illegal firearms. As noted, it appears that great strides have been made in addressing this first step. This is likely to have an impact through the incapacitation of high-risk, high-volume chronic offenders most likely to become involved in gun crime (as perpetrators and victims). These can be thought of as the primary PSN targets.

The most successful PSN initiatives have really made an impact on gun crime when they couple this first stage with a variety of efforts to communicate this focused deterrence message ("If you illegally carry a gun or use a gun in a crime, you will get all of our attention, and there is a credible risk of arrest, prosecution, and incarceration"). The key to these efforts is street-level intelligence that identifies those associates of PSN targets who are most likely to replace those who have been incarcerated. These are the associated crew members; friends; people whose names routinely show up as an associate, a victim, a witness, a suspect, a person in a stopped vehicle, etc. These can be thought of as the secondary PSN targets. It is when there is routine targeting of both primary and secondary targets, through street-level intelligence, that PSN task forces have moved from some level of violence reduction to very significant violence reduction.

Street-level intelligence is key to making this happen. One source of intelligence is the PSN gun crime review meetings. Comstat is an additional source. Highly effective PSN task forces have also used the Incident Review (IR) meeting as a third invaluable source of intelligence (see resources). The IR meeting involves the systematic review of every homicide and shooting on a regular basis (weekly or biweekly). The review provides both strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence (who is involved [victims, offenders, witnesses, associates], where did it occur, why, likely retaliation, etc.). The tactical intelligence is particularly valuable because it connects what is known about current violence patterns to both primary and secondary targets. Thus, every week or two, the meeting results in a group of primary and secondary targets who can then become the targets of the district task forces, Violent Crime Abatement Teams, knock-and-talks, and federal task forces. Secondary targets can also be the subjects of call-in meetings.

Many of the effective PSN task forces utilize offender call-in meetings. In these, secondary targets are told to attend a meeting (typically by a letter from the Superintendent, the District Attorney, and the U.S. Attorney). They are informed that they were invited because of their association with individuals involved in gun violence and warned of the penalties for illegal gun possession and use. They are also informed about primary targets who have been incarcerated. Members of the community express their concern with violence, and efforts are made to offer services for those who may be so inclined. The goal is to communicate the message that the risks for illegal gun carrying and involvement in gun violence are real and continued involvement will result in every effort to get them off the street—but to communicate the message respectfully and with the support of the community. The meetings are most

effective when they are strategic in the sense of targeting groups and crews of known associates and based on current levels of violence in the community.

The officers assigned to PSN, their commanders, and the prosecuting agencies appear to be highly motivated and committed to working together to focus on the “worst of the worst” offenders. This effort has been strongly supported by the key criminal justice leaders in the city, including the Superintendent, the District Attorney, and the U.S. Attorney. Already, this effort has been successful in a number of high-profile cases. Now that the effort has been established and is demonstrating its value to the department and the city, it is time for it to become more formalized. None of the officers involved have received PSN training, the unit has not developed written policies and guidelines, criteria for selection of cases have not been established, and criteria for selection and evaluation of PSN officers have not been formulated. In addition, successful PSN programs have two components that are not obvious in this implementation: a research component and an organized outreach to and publicity campaign for the community. We recommend that the department begin to better formalize what all consider a successful beginning by addressing each of these elements within the next six months.

Code 6

In July 2010, the department revitalized its Code 6 program. Modeled after a program in the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office that has been considered successful in addressing violent crime, it involves a detailed analysis of criminal careers. A point system is developed that is used to score suspects who have been arrested. Those who reach a certain level of serious prior criminal history are designated as a Code 6 offender. Using this system, the police and other criminal justice actors work to ensure that these offenders receive higher bail, more attention, and longer sentences. Initially, this effort used the scoring system developed in Jefferson Parish. Currently, a system tailored for New Orleans is being developed. This effort is in its early stages but, like PSN, needs more structure and formalization. Training, policies, and research assistance are needed to move this effort forward. Also at issue is how Code 6, PSN, and other programs are coordinated. The potential for considerable overlap exists. This potential problem currently is addressed by communication between the units. Later, we describe a research effort that we think could ensure that the various offender-focused efforts could be better coordinated and made more effective.

Violent Crime Abatement Teams

This effort involves a team of detectives who focus on the 25 most violent criminals in New Orleans. Their task is to work with the District Attorney’s Office and other agencies to monitor the behavior of these individuals and arrest them when they commit a crime. The list of criminals is prepared by requesting that each district submit its three most dangerous residents. An expanded warrant squad has also been launched to apprehend those violent offenders who have failed to appear for court. This effort also targets these high-risk offenders when they are in violation of court orders. Similar to the efforts described above, the Violent Crime Abatement Team effort has operated without specific training and research to determine the quality of those

referred to the unit and the relationship among Violent Crime Abatement Teams, PSN, Code 6, and other new initiatives.

Knock-and-Talk

The knock-and-talk program is operated out of the Special Investigations Unit. It consists of an officer who works with the PSN detectives to identify all felony gun convictions, convicted gun felons of probation and parole, and those gun felons with outstanding warrants. As names are entered on the knock-and talk list, the officer seeks to identify their current address. Once the address is verified, the officer will visit the address to survey the property and will discuss the case with a probation and parole agent, if there is one. The officer will engage in one or more of the following efforts: visit to talk to the target and/or other residents; develop probable cause for an arrest, obtain an arrest warrant, make the arrest, or use the tactical squad for high-risk warrant serving. As of late December, this officer has identified 127 knock-and-talk cases, which have resulted in 12 arrests. Again, the dedication and ingenuity of this officer were obvious. As with our other observations, we found staff in these special units committed to their success and the reduction of violence in the city. However, we also found that the officer in this effort had no training on knock-and-talk, little research support, and no formal policies and guidelines to guide these efforts or ensure coordination with the other offender-focused efforts.

Crime Laboratory

Hurricane Katrina and budget problems created substantial problems for the crime laboratory that the department is gradually overcoming. For example, the department will soon hire two DNA analysts to work at the State Police Crime Laboratory. No effective homicide reduction program can be successful without a modern functioning crime laboratory. This not only impacts clearance rates, but it also contributes to the department's ability to reduce homicide. These problems are well known to the NOPD leadership, and the August action plan contained many steps to begin to address this problem. Although none of us on the homicide review team are forensic specialists, we are convinced that while the steps being taken will help, the long-term solution requires a comprehensive plan to establish the kinds of modern crime laboratory capabilities that are found in many other agencies. This may well include further expansion of the cooperative efforts already undertaken with the Louisiana State Police. This will require outside experts who can develop a plan that is tailored to the needs and budget restraints of the city. We urge the NOPD to have such a study conducted soon so that a comprehensive plan for the crime laboratory can be developed and begin to be implemented.

Staffing and Deployment

It is our understanding that a police staffing and deployment study has not been conducted "in generations." It is important that the department conduct the study it announced in the August plan. Given the high degree of homicide clustering, the changing demographics of the city, and the need to reduce staff in the NOPD, a deployment plan that is current, flexible, and focused on serious crime is a necessity. Although we were not asked to conduct such a

study, its need became obvious to us as soon as we began exploring the current operation of the department. It will be difficult to fully implement the August plan without completing this study and using it to efficiently deploy the current resources.

Summary

The department has made remarkable strides in implementing the comprehensive plan released on August 23, 2010. This plan contains many of the most innovative and effective strategies that are being used today to reduce crime and violence in other cities. In just four months, all of the elements of the plan have been completed, initiated, or planned. Our review of the elements of the plan, which are mostly directed at reducing homicides, has determined that all of these are operating and are showing signs of effectiveness. However, we have also concluded that for all of them, it is time to take steps to integrate these efforts, formalize their procedures, provide training to the staff assigned to them, develop the research support these efforts require, and gain more community support for these efforts and for the department more generally. Training and establishing operating procedures for each of these efforts can build off the experiences of other successful use of these approaches. For example, PSN has been evaluated in numerous cities, and best practices have been established for this type of effort. The department should use the training available and develop standard operating procedures using the approaches used in other successful implementations of PSN. The same strategy could be used for Violent Crime Abatement Teams, knock-and-talk, and Code 6.

Each of these strategies is directed at those whose past behavior suggests they are very likely to be engaged in violent crime, including homicide. Currently, these determinations are based on the experience of staff and the knowledge they have of the areas they police. While this clinical approach is understandable when these types of efforts begin, the most successful programs use more research-based strategies to identify targets. A research-based approach also assists in making sure that the different strategies are coordinated. We recommend that the department seek assistance in developing a research foundation for the programs reviewed above. Two examples of what we have in mind are the work of the Philadelphia Police Department and that of the Louisiana Department of Corrections. In Philadelphia, the police department, in conjunction with the probation services, worked with Professor Richard Berk and his associates to develop a prediction scheme to identify those who were on probation and were at high risk for committing a homicide.¹⁴ Those predicted to be at high risk of committing a homicide were given extra supervision and services. The procedures used significantly increased the accuracy of identifying those likely to commit homicide. In the Louisiana example, the Department of Corrections worked with the SAS Institute as a follow-up to a previously completed parole study. In this effort, the Department of Corrections sought to conduct a similar analysis of its probation clients to determine whether there are identifiable, common factors that differentiate between probationers who do and do not violate the terms of their probation during the course of their probation or probationers who commit a new crime and return to probation after their release from probationary status. The resulting prediction instrument was significantly better than chance in identifying those who appear to be at risk of probation failure. The tools

¹⁴ See Richard Berk et al., "Forecasting Murder Within a Population of Probationers and Parolees: A High Stakes Application of Statistical Learning," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 2009: pp. 191–211.

utilized by SAS could easily be adapted to the prediction of violence. These examples of what some have called “predictive policing” are not meant to replace the judgment of experienced practitioners. Rather, they are meant to provide a more structured tool to assist decision making and to efficiently focus resources on high-risk offenders. The NOPD should explore the use of these tools in structuring its various efforts to focus on high-risk offenders.

INITIATIVES THE NOPD SHOULD CONSIDER ADDING TO ITS PLAN

Although we are hesitant to recommend new efforts for a department that is already implementing many new initiatives and is facing severe financial pressures, there are three initiatives that we think should be considered. In the next section of this report, we detail one of these—the need for enhanced crime analysis that impacts how the police seek to address crime in the city. The other two are the development of homicide review teams and a greater involvement of the community in the department.

Homicide Review Teams

Through the homicide review model developed in Milwaukee, members of the criminal justice community meet monthly (e.g., from the District Attorney’s Office, Medical Examiner, Department of Corrections, and ATF) with staff assistance to examine the area’s most recent homicides for possible opportunities for prevention, intervention, and suppression. Milwaukee’s homicide review approach, which has been in operation for the last five years, has developed into a proven strategy that blends community policing and prevention into the systematic review of homicides. The review process brings to light the factors that lead to violence and provides opportunities to organize criminal justice and community partners to address the issues, while at the same time developing a strong partnership with those entities. This program has been evaluated through a grant from the National Institute of Justice. That evaluation found a marked and statistically significant effect. Police districts where the program had been implemented experienced a 52 percent decrease in the monthly count of homicides, compared to a 9 percent decrease in control police districts. The success of this program has resulted in the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) funding the Milwaukee team to assist other cities in developing their own teams.¹⁵ We have urged the NOPD to seek this assistance, and we understand they are pursuing the development of this program. We think this effort will not only assist the department in reducing homicides but will also provide a means to involve the community in better understanding what needs to be done in New Orleans to reduce homicides.

Engaging the Community

The NOPD has taken numerous steps to rebuild relations with the community and engage the community in the life of the department. The creation of Community Coordinating Officers in each district, their training, the expansion of crime prevention programs, the opening up of

¹⁵ For details, go to http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/December_2010/Milwaukee-Homicide-Review-Project.asp (accessed December 22, 2010).

Comstat meetings, and the establishment of relationships with key civic organizations are just some of the initiatives in the August plan. These components are operating as planned. Although we were not able to assess their effectiveness, they represent the kind of steps departments are taking to establish the foundation for effective community policing. Building and sustaining relationships with the community are critical elements to reducing violence. Strong trust and relationships among residents, business owners, and the police facilitate communication and cooperation when it comes to sharing of information and in helping to prevent and solve crime. We believe this has to occur at the district level and must involve more than department and district leadership. Officers and investigators must also engage with the community, building one-to-one relationships. The August 2010 “Rebuilding the New Orleans Police Department—First Steps” plan outlined a number of valuable activities for community relationship building. A stated first step was to “engage each neighborhood in collaborative problem solving, prioritize the response, follow up to response, and evaluate results.” Additionally, specific programs were emphasized, including a citizen callback system; a citizen police academy; the Cops, Clergy and Community Coalition; monthly crime walks; a citizen advisory panel; the El Protector Program; and a Victim/Witness Assistance program. We commend the NOPD for these and other efforts.

We suggest a significant commitment to the above programs and offer additional suggestions about police-community relations. Given the significant difficulties in identifying and locating witnesses to violent crime and homicide, we suggest that the NOPD consider systems for anonymous tips or reporting, such as the “Text-A-Tip” initiative now under way in a number of cities.¹⁶ Much like the Cops, Clergy and Community Coalition, in which the police partner with faith-based community representatives, district staff should look to other stakeholder groups (i.e., ethnically diverse groups, youth agencies, health centers) to help bridge the police and these various constituent groups. We believe many officers and commanders are engaged in neighborhood groups, so we support broadening involvement in these groups to have officers serve in formal roles in these organizations. This could be similar to the advisory board noted previously. Further, some districts are using “e-mail blasts” to communicate to the community about crime or community concerns. In some cases, community members use these “e-mail blasts” as a way to provide feedback to the police. We encourage all districts to use this technique, as well as other electronic tools (e.g., podcasts, blogs), to build relationships and to track the communications from and to the community.

To build relationships, individuals must have exposure to each other under a variety of circumstances, and they must have a mutual understanding of what each brings to the table—vis-à-vis crime prevention and solution. There must also be clear expectations about the role each partner plays in building and sustaining safe neighborhoods. We believe the NOPD must take the lead and be wholeheartedly invested in both the process and outcomes associated with successful community participation.

¹⁶ Boston initiated this and can offer support in the initiation of the resource.

IMPROVING CRIME ANALYSIS IN THE NOPD

Focus on Crime Analysis

A necessary step in identifying and developing effective violence reduction strategies is to thoroughly understand the problem and its underlying conditions.¹⁷ With that in mind, a review of data collection, analyses, and utilization practices is a critical first step in building problem analysis capacity. This review is not an in-depth evaluation of any of the NOPD's analytical strategies but rather an assessment of the current analytical practices compared to suggested approaches for effective problem solving and crime reduction. Moreover, through a more proactive approach to violence reduction via problem analysis, the development and implementation of violence reduction strategies will be grounded in the data and better positioned to produce desired results.

The following objectives directed our efforts:

1. Gain an understanding of the reporting and analyses processes currently in place, with particular interest in aggravated assaults and gun-related incidents.
2. Focus on data inputs by reviewing the current data collection system. This includes assessing what data are collected, if and how crime data and intelligence are combined with other data (e.g., community safety surveys, social disorder data, reentry data), the quality of the data, and how these data are managed and reported.
3. Review current data outputs (i.e., crime reports, maps via Comstat, and other means) generated and/or disseminated by the NOPD. An assessment of outputs in relation to best practices in crime and disorder will inform NOPD practices.

To accomplish the above,¹⁸ we interviewed 22 NOPD representatives whom we consider to be assemblers and users of crime-related data. These representatives included a sample of district Comstat officers, district supervisors and investigators, representatives from the IT Office, and representatives from the Policy and Planning Unit. We also observed one department-wide and one district Comstat, collected and reviewed a number of NOPD reports, and reviewed 200 incident reports. Lastly, we reviewed relevant NOPD and City of New Orleans planning documents and the most recent research on the collection, analysis, and utilization of crime data.

There are myriad changes under way in the NOPD, so this review is based on data collected and reviewed between September 2010 and January 2011, with the recognition that organizational, procedural, and technological changes may have taken place while we were completing this report.

¹⁷ See Goldstein, 1979.

¹⁸ Special thanks go to Robin Toof and Jenna Savage, who supported data collection and analysis.

There is an opportunity for the NOPD to develop a strong and dynamic crime analysis capacity to identify, analyze, and disseminate crime and disorder information to internal and external customers in a systematic way. The development of this capacity is sure to have a positive impact on the development and implementation of targeted and effective crime prevention, intervention, and reduction strategies. It was communicated to us in several conversations that while many intra- and interorganizational improvements have occurred in the past five years, there have been tremendous setbacks in analysis activities following Hurricane Katrina and many of today's challenges did not exist pre-Katrina. We take this point seriously and hope to offer feedback and direction on how to bring the NOPD to a new place in terms of its analytic capacity and success. Indeed, by adapting and changing a number of analytical functions and activities, NOPD has the potential to become a twenty-first-century model for crime analysis and utilization.

Our observations, interviews, and analyses produced a number of insights. A particularly important starting point focuses on the Comstat officer. Given that the NOPD is organized around a decentralized district model, the placement of analysts or Comstat officers within districts to work closely with district personnel is a significant benefit to identifying and understanding localized crime and disorder problems. However, this decentralization often results in individuals and districts operating as their own police department, looking at and analyzing crime in their own way. We learned that there is no standard policy for crime analysis in the NOPD, and job descriptions do not exist for Comstat officers. What results is each officer conducting their work according to the desires of each district supervisor. Although officers are located within districts, they have very limited interaction with officers on the street, they are not typically involved in conversations about how the data are being used (meaning strategy design), and they do not receive much feedback about how the data were used and to what effect. These differences lead to varied analytical processes and outcomes.

We also learned that Comstat officers are selected primarily because of their technical skills and/or comfort with software and that a significant amount of their time is spent on problem-solving technical issues for district staff rather than conducting meaningful analyses. Further, most training in crime analysis happens on the job. We understand that officers have received and will receive specialized training as CrimeView from Omega is adopted, but currently there is no formal system for how Comstat officers are selected and trained and how they operate. Given these challenges, we believe there is a need to formalize the analytical work in the NOPD so that Comstat officers can operate at their full potential and contribute to the goals of the NOPD.

After gaining an understanding of the Comstat officer position, we then looked towards the data collection and related systems in place at the NOPD. There is a significant amount of quantitative and qualitative data available at the district and headquarters levels. Truly, there are multiple sources (or pockets) of data within the NOPD, as well as outside, but there is no real "system" for bringing the multiple sources together and for analyzing these data for prevention, intervention, and suppression efforts. Specific examples were offered. Incident reports contain an abundance of data, not just in the field boxes checked off but also within the narratives. Not only do narratives offer important insights into the circumstances and individuals of incidents,

but with some improvements in the narrative content, they can serve as a tool to reduce future crime. The case management system, a highly regarded addition to the NOPD, captures some data for specific purposes, but not all data are utilized. We also learned that current capacity allows for Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) data to be culled and analyzed, but any data outside of specified UCR data are not analyzed. Intelligence data are not systematically integrated with incident data; therefore, there are opportunities for serious gaps in understanding victims, offenders, incidents, and location-based violence. Lastly, there seems to be either an absence of or huge gaps in non-police-related data that could be of use; meaningful community data (including community intelligence); and probation, parole, or court data. Interestingly, at least one district representative touted “e-mail blasts” as a way to communicate to the community and as a mechanism to obtain data and information from the community.¹⁹ We understand that CopLink will be added to the department’s analytical toolkit, but this may or may not address the issues relative to a broader understanding of crime and disorder in NOPD neighborhoods.

Another important aspect of the analytical function of the NOPD is analytical strategy. We learned that there is no short- or long-term crime analysis strategy or crime analysis priorities to direct the work and use of statistics in each district as well as across districts. This observation actually has several dimensions. It appears that the analytic priority at this time, which we learned is mainly influenced by human resource capacity issues, is to focus primarily on UCR crime. This is not to say that varied data are not collected and reviewed across districts, but we learned that data entry clerks are extracting only certain data from incident reports.²⁰

Generally speaking, the extent of analysis under way at the time of our review was aligned with basic data compilation and the production of crime or incident counts. Changes in crime were considered, acknowledging reductions or increases over periods of time. NOPD’s recent acquisition of CrimeView and the use of ESRI will enhance the analytical work of the NOPD by improving spatial mapping with a variety of queries. This is a great move forward and should be an integral component of a new analytic strategy that moves towards a more in-depth and sophisticated approach to understanding crime and disorder.

Overall, the analysis of data in the NOPD is primarily reactive and tactical, rarely proactive and strategic. Analysis is most often conducted in reaction to or driven by daily crime problems. We learned from our interviews and review that analytical reports are used to tell people what to do or where to put staff each day. There is recognition that the limited human and technological resources make more strategic analyses of data a challenge, though most of our interviewees expressed a desire to be more informed about various tactical and strategic uses of data and to develop the ability to do so.

District supervisors work closely with their Comstat officers to look at data in a number of different ways, again in a more tactical or reactive manner. Commanders, supervisors and, even, officers use and want the data in a number of different ways (e.g., time frames, numbers

¹⁹ It might be helpful to track how e-mail blasts are used and what is generated in terms of community relations and information.

²⁰ We learned that officers are inputting data from reports into a computerized system, but then clerks must manually extract certain data and re-input it into another system. This is a critical waste of time and resources, and the redundancy should be addressed as soon as possible.

versus visuals, etc.) that may or may not be meaningful in terms of understanding patterns. Comstat officers spend a good amount of time “guessing” what they might be asked for. In many instances, when called to a meeting to discuss crime patterns or trends, they are forced to overprepare to accommodate unanticipated requests. What results are more outputs, but less meaningful outcomes. Similarly, absent an analytical strategy, officers are often producing the same reports with slight variations or are being asked to produce a report on certain crimes that has already been produced for another purpose.

The idea of using UCR data as a measure of crime has some value; however, there is increasing recognition that UCR must be supplemented with other data. An improved analytical strategy would expand beyond UCR to include calls for service, physical and social disorder data, and victimization and community perception data. Each of these other sources offers insights into crime and disorder that cannot be gained from UCR data alone. Of course, all of these potential measures of public safety come with challenges in terms of data collection, quality, and analysis, but an expanded perspective and analysis would lead to a more accurate picture of crime, disorder, and feelings of safety in New Orleans.

The central IT Unit was cited as a great resource for the department. They offer a substantial amount of support and serve as the department’s “help desk.” They offer a variety of supports, including database maintenance, technical and analytical support, maintenance of historical data, special investigative inquiry support, and some spatial analysis. This office seems to be an ideal place to help create, drive, and monitor an analytical strategy for the organization. There are broader needs relative to quality control, citywide analyses, forecasting, the integration of data and, just generally, a more “big-picture perspective” that might be best placed within the central IT office.

Effective problem analysis and the resulting strategy involve more than just the collection and analysis of data. An important dimension includes the relationships and coordination of work across units. There seems to be little formal and systematic interaction and information sharing between crime analysts or Comstat officers and investigative units (including homicide) relative to proactive and more strategic analytical work. While having Comstat officers in districts seems to work for the officers and the commanders, there are no opportunities to bring the district officers together or for better coordination of work and analysis across the districts. The decentralized model of both Comstat officers and detectives seems to be quite helpful to relationships and information sharing amongst these groups and patrol. However, there is interest in being better connected to commanders and to the community for the purpose of improving the analytical work. Additionally, if there is an abundance of data located within districts and within investigative units, then a formal system (technical and relational) would facilitate more information sharing and more strategic and proactive work to reduce crime and disorder.

It is quite clear that there is a tremendous amount of data and intelligence within the NOPD files and held by officers, investigators, and others in the NOPD. Indeed, there are a number of steps to be taken to improve on the collection, analysis, and utilization of these data. These ideas will be discussed in detail in subsequent sections. The final observation of our review of data collection, analysis, and utilization practices involves two distinct yet related

activities—the reports or documents generated from these data, as well as Comstat as the main managerial mechanism for discussing and using these crime analysis outputs.

There were common themes when discussing the Comstat forum with various NOPD representatives. Additionally, we had the chance to observe a department-wide Comstat as well as a district Comstat. Most people with whom we met indicated that they wanted more from Comstat. While there is recognition that it is improving and there is a lot of value from sharing information and seeing others from across the department regularly, Comstat is still a missed opportunity and should be more of a learning tool. In some cases, Comstat is still viewed as too antagonistic, with questions being more aligned with an inquisition rather than a dialogue. Data are becoming more of a part of what people talk about, and it happens at the district level too. This is clearly a positive sign. Most of the analysis seems to be short-term. We question how valuable this short-term lens is to understanding real patterns and formulating tactical and strategic deployment and what seems most appropriate and valuable to discuss at Comstat. There is no real problem solving happening at the meetings. Many questioned what results from the Comstat meeting; thus it is important to revisit the intent and expected outcomes of Comstat and then redesign the meeting to meet those goals.

The department-wide Comstat meeting is well attended and open to the public. Many recognized that there are pros and cons to the open meeting format. While there are benefits to bringing this diverse group together, only a small percentage of those in attendance are actually engaged in any real dialogue and reporting at any given time, so the majority is left to fill their time on other matters. Although the inclusion of a time clock is a valuable tool, it is unclear whether the time-limited report-outs from each presenter are as valuable to learning and understanding changes in crime and disorder as they could be. So, given the limited amount of time each presenter has, is the time being used in an efficient *AND* effective way? Most of the same can be said for the district Comstat meeting in terms of content, purpose, and participation.

Review of Districts' Comstat²¹ and Other Crime Analysis Outputs

The second part of this section is the “Comstat book.” The district and department-wide Comstat books seem to be the primary analytical outputs coming from Comstat officers. The breadth of data included in district Comstat books is considerable. The report is well organized into sections, including Administrative Reports, Comstat Trends, Uniform Crime Reports, and District Arrest and Investigative Reports. We learned that these reports are generated on a weekly basis for a meeting of key district staff. There is also a Comstat book produced for the weekly department-wide Comstat meeting, with contributions coming from districts and central IT. We reviewed the department-wide Comstat book for one week, as well as one week's report for each of the eight districts. Our observations point to overlaps with previous highlights about the NOPD's analytical strategy, and we see these as going hand-in-hand with how the NOPD uses its data. We discuss our observations below.

²¹ The name of the report was the District Comstat Report, but the table of contents page was labeled “Compstat Report.” There seems to be a discrepancy in title, so we recommend adopting either Comstat or Compstat consistently across the NOPD.

Given the varied and extensive data included in both versions of the report, we doubt that the purpose of the meeting and the broad range of Comstat data are complementary. The inclusion of administrative (i.e., personnel deployment, response times) data seems beyond the intent of Comstat. Some commanders reported that they do not look at all of the books' contents. The level of detail provided in each week's book seems unnecessary and in conflict with the idea of crime and disorder problem solving. This does not imply that these data are not useful, but rather they seem more appropriate for some type of management or administrative meeting rather than Comstat.²² Ultimately, a vast amount of data is produced and disseminated that is not discussed at Comstat meetings.

It is understandable that given the significant data and the advance work needed to pull these data together weekly, most of the data in the Comstat book are merely copies of spreadsheets that lay out hundreds of individual data points. We suspect this is an efficient way to produce the data with such frequency. However, the inclusion of counts is not user-friendly, nor do they seem to help the reader understand the characteristics and underlying conditions associated with the city's most troublesome crime problems.

This process begs the question of whether these specific types of data are reviewed beyond these basic counts and individual data points.²³ While looking at the number of walking beats in a week by zone, the total number of hours dedicated to walking beats, or the number of citizen contacts or community meetings attended (which are helpful when looking to capture inputs), we saw no indication that these data are analyzed according to where the beats are placed and what types of prevention, intervention, or suppression activities are accomplished by officers on walking beats. Similarly important insights about what happens as a result of citizen contacts or officer participation in community meetings are missing. Although the counts surely provide an account of specific activities that occur on shifts and across districts, they do not reflect the meaningful activities or outcomes of these specific community policing activities.

A more advanced review and analysis of the data will offer important insights into what officers are doing and with what effect. This is particularly important relative to community interaction and identifying ways to prevent crime rather than reacting to it. If officers are doing interesting and effective work on the street, the current reports are not capturing this. Additionally, more in-depth reporting will inform whether and how officers are interacting with the community and whether these interactions are changing and/or improving over time. These types of analyses and reports would seem to be more valuable for the district and the department. The counts are certainly an important data point, but they seem somewhat misleading in terms of productivity. We suggest that counts be supplemented with more meaningful and telling analysis for all to review and consider.

In the review of the crime trend reports, we find similar opportunities. The Comstat reports, which are generated weekly, include a variety of comparisons (e.g., year-to-year comparison; 2009 versus 2010 weekly comparisons; two-, four-, and eight-week comparisons;

²² Like Comstat, it seems critical to identify the purpose and goals of an administrative meeting and design the content and frequency around these goals.

²³ It is possible that counts are practical for public dissemination but are not as valuable to understanding and solving crime problems.

year-to-date weekly comparison; weekly averages). These comparisons are not always valuable to understand patterns and trends. While crime counts offer insight into how crime has changed over time, research shows that geographic analysis of crime, in which analysis and attention are directed to crime hot spots, is a more effective way to understand and solve local crime problems.²⁴ We understand that CrimeView will allow analysts to conduct some spatial analyses, so this will help to move the NOPD closer to twenty-first-century analysis practices. It is well established that a small number of places account for the majority of crime,²⁵ so we recommend that counts be supplemented by crime hot-spot analyses of the most troublesome locations. Concentrating on the nature and characteristics of crime in microplaces will help the NOPD focus its attention, resources, and community efforts on those places (and, in many cases, the individuals) that account for the majority of crime and violence.

The sample department-wide Comstat reports that we assessed are also rich in detail. The details of the report come from Comstat Briefing Summary Reports for UCR crimes, warrants served, and arrests made. Additional documents included interoffice reports regarding robberies, shootings, and homicides, which offer additional analytical opportunities. Given the significant amount of time dedicated to the creation of these reports, the NOPD must assess the value associated with each report. For example, the weekly A-Case Acceptance Rate appears to be informative, as it reports on the rate of acceptance of NOPD cases submitted to the District Attorney's Office. The report offers insights into why some cases are not accepted, which can inform investigative, reporting, or training practices. Similar assessments of each report should assess the value of each report to the Comstat process.

These reports are full of qualitative data. These data offer information that may add more meaning to the individual crime counts. The NOPD should consider using report content and narratives for additional analyses. Further, considering that the one district Comstat meeting we attended was approximately 60 minutes long, it seems unlikely that all of these details can be discussed at each meeting. Therefore, we suggest a review of the packet content for what would be most useful at the weekly meeting and what other data can be culled and analyzed for tactical and strategic purposes.

Reviewing Incident Reports

The final task associated with this analytical functioning review centered on a review of aggravated assault and weapons-related incident reports. We reviewed a sample of 25²⁶ of these reports from each district. As noted previously, violence reduction strategies should be grounded in quality problem analysis. Using data to understand the nature and characteristics of persistent crime problems leads to more appropriate short- and long-term strategies. Our objective here was to gain an understanding of the quality of the reports to identify strengths and weaknesses of quality, with the idea that by focusing on aggravated assault and weapons-related incidents, there

²⁴ See Braga and Weisburd, 2010.

²⁵ See Braga, Papachristos, and Hureau, 2010.

²⁶ We asked each district to provide us with 25 aggravated assault and/or weapons-related incident reports from 2009. We did not follow a scientific selection method, as our intent was not to test for relationships between variables but rather to review a sample of reports for quality. Our final report total was 199 incident reports.

are additional opportunities for violence reduction—a more proactive approach to homicide prevention and reduction. Our analyses were not focused solely on analyzing the incident report data per se but also on identifying ways in which incident report data can be used and/or improved to inform violence reduction strategies. We consulted existing research on violent crime to help us compare the content and quality of the NOPD reports to best practices.

Incident reports offer a tremendous opportunity for problem analysis. The NOPD incident reports have a wealth of data and information that can be used for prevention, intervention, and suppression efforts. Generally, we found the quality of the reports to be satisfactory. The level of detail provided in the narrative portion of the report is also generally strong. Our central concern is whether or not the data and information included in incident reports are used to their fullest potential. There were many questions about how these data are stored: (1) whether they are inputted into a searchable database and analyzed in a variety of ways on a regular basis, (2) whether officers writing reports have been adequately prepared/trained to not only complete the report but to ask the right kinds of questions that will inform investigations and strategy,²⁷ and (3) whether they are analyzed for more strategic approaches to violence reduction. Given what we learned and observed relative to Comstat, the data included in the Comstat books, and the focus on UCR crime counts as the main analytical strategy, we believe not.²⁸

Some of the more notable observations from our review of aggravated assault and weapon-related incidents are detailed below:

- In general, the incident reports contain a wealth of information, including assorted description details of the suspect (build, scars, tattoos, apparel, speech, complexion, oddities, etc.), motive, crime location, and offender's approach to the victim, as well as details of the incident itself provided in the report's narrative. There seem to be significant opportunities for analyses of these data to understand the nature and characteristics of aggravated assault and weapons-related incidents, as well as to examine the characteristics and behaviors of offenders and victims, especially repeat offenders and/or victims.
- In many cases, the designated field or variable box within the report had one piece of information, whereas the narrative had additional or more clarifying information. Some examples are noted below:
 - The location of the incident was noted in the majority of reports we reviewed. In some cases, the address was not noted in the appropriate box of the report; yet we found the exact location of the incident noted in the narrative.

²⁷ It is safe to say that officers receive report-writing training in the academy and, in some instances, in-service training. However, as we learn more about the importance of data and the role of problem analysis in prevention, intervention, and suppression of violent crime, it may be that more research-based training is needed to support officer reporting from the field.

²⁸ We understand that the NOPD is in the midst of significant organizational change; therefore, our observations are based on what we learned from interviews, observations, and reports during the past four months.

- Very few of the incident reports we reviewed noted witnesses at the scene. We learned through the narrative reviews that there were, in fact, individuals at the scene who witnessed the incident but they were not noted as witnesses. It seems critical to identify ways to try to increase the identification and/or cooperation of witnesses. Some districts had higher percentages of witnesses listed than others. It would be important to understand why this varies by district. Given the importance of witnesses in solving cases and preventing future violence, including homicides, this seems to be a piece of data that warrants attention. Additionally, improving witness identification may also contribute to the identification of offenders.
- The motive for the incident in a majority of reports we reviewed was “unknown.” Yet in many cases, some insight into motive could be found in the report narratives. A thorough analysis of the information available in the narratives might reduce the amount of “unknowns” in these reports.
- The relationship of offender to victim seems to be another data point that could be improved. Victims often reported that offenders were strangers. Many incidents noted that the relationship of the victim to offender was “unknown.” A more in-depth review of the narrative revealed a more accurate picture of the relationship. For instance, reading a report narrative often revealed that what was noted as an “unknown” relationship between victim and offender was, in fact, a “stranger” relationship. We are concerned that officers may be using “unknown” and “stranger” interchangeably. This miscategorization inhibits an accurate analysis of the problem for tactical and strategic intervention.
- The “sobriety” measure in the report may not be providing the most valuable information to officers and analysts. Unless specific sobriety tests are administered, it may be difficult to ascertain whether a victim or suspect has been drinking or using drugs at the time of an incident. The presence of alcohol or drugs at the scene might be more valuable, and in many cases, this information can be found in the narrative portions of the reports.

The above review is intended to shed light on the analytical practices of the NOPD to identify opportunities for (1) improving the collection, analysis, and utilization of data and (2) to inform violence prevention and reduction strategies. In addition to the organizational and community improvement work needed to reduce homicides, the twenty-first-century police department must focus more meticulously on problem analysis. This work entails ensuring that quality data are collected and analyzed in meaningful and proactive ways. To do so requires adequate and ongoing training and development of all levels of personnel in problem analysis, strategy development, and assessment. We would suggest that this problem analysis work is the most important to effective crime and disorder prevention and reduction.

In that vein, we offer a variety of recommendations to support the analytical advancement and development of effective violence reduction strategies used by the NOPD and the community. These recommendations are put forth with awareness that many of these improvements will support the goals and activities outlined in the August 2010 “Rebuilding the New Orleans Police Department—First Steps.”

CONCLUSIONS

Our review of crime in New Orleans and the way the New Orleans Police Department is responding to it has led us to a number of observations and conclusions that we have discussed in the above sections. In this final section, we provide our thoughts on our primary task, which was to identify ways the NOPD can further contribute to the reduction of crime in the city. We approach this last section with caution, not only because of the brevity of our review but also because we recognize that change is occurring daily in the NOPD—all of it driven by the goal of restoring the community’s belief in the NOPD and decreasing crime.

Our review convinced us that the primary crime problem in New Orleans is homicide. Other crimes need to be addressed, but their levels do not suggest a problem that the police and community cannot continue to address with the strategies and practices in place. On the other hand, homicide rates are ten times higher than the national rate and five times higher than the rate for comparably sized cities. New Orleans has had even higher rates of homicide in the not-too-distant past. We urge the NOPD and the city to enhance the efforts already under way to address this aspect of the crime problem.

This response begins with a clear recognition that addressing homicide in New Orleans must be guided by better crime analysis. Homicides are not connected to one or a few sets of conditions. It is not large, organized gangs vying for turf that drives homicide levels. It is not the kinds of drug wars we have seen in other cities. The diverse nature of homicides in the city makes it even more important that in New Orleans the effort to reduce homicide levels be focused on those places where homicides cluster and on those individuals who are likely to be homicide offenders and victims. This focus can occur only if there is better crime analysis that drives operations.

To improve crime analysis, we recommend the following:

Formalize and Strengthen the Crime Analysis Functions: As noted, there are a number of activities that could facilitate more impactful crime analysis within the NOPD. These activities range from formal policy development and training of staff and commanders to the development and implementation of a crime analysis strategy. A more formal crime analysis system will support a more advanced and professional crime analysis operation.

Improve Data Collection and Analysis: We suggest that the NOPD review whether and how the significant data collected through incident reports are analyzed, as well as how these data are combined with other sources of data (e.g., Computer-Aided Dispatch, Field Interrogation Cards, intelligence, community surveys) to provide a more accurate and

comprehensive picture of crime and disorder. Additionally, the NOPD currently produces an inordinate amount of data outputs, some of which offer insights into short-term changes over time. Recent advances to mapping will help to identify hot-spot areas most in need of attention. We suggest that the NOPD use these advances and more advanced analyses to institutionalize data-driven problem analysis.

Revisit and Improve Comstat: Comstat offers an opportunity to bring a diverse group of NOPD staff and community members together to review current crime patterns. In these meetings, commanders and staff are called to account for identifying and solving crime problems. However, in its current form, the NOPD's Comstat is not reaching its full potential. We recommend a review of the purpose and expected outcomes of Comstat, combined with an assessment of participation, with the idea of creating a forum for information sharing, problem solving, and organizational learning.

To improve current NOPD initiatives, we recommend the following:

Formalize the elements of the August 2010 plan that focus on homicide. This includes PSN, Violent Crime Abatement Teams, knock-and-talk, and Code 6 as well as the task forces. Training, improved coordination, and the use of crime analysis and predictive policing to identify the focus for each of these efforts should be accomplished as soon as possible. Although these programs are working well, it is not clear whether they will have an impact on homicides without the kinds of enhancements we are suggesting. Essential is the completion of the revitalization of crime laboratory and forensic functions. The first step is the development of a comprehensive plan to do this and then securing the funding to develop and staff these functions.

To supplement the current plan, we recommend the following:

We understand that the NOPD has already begun the process of establishing a homicide review team as recommended above. This is an important step in moving from place-based policing to understanding why homicides are clustering as they are. Given the homicide patterns we describe above, the more detailed analyses that a homicide review team will do routinely will be of great benefit in developing responses that can reduce homicides.

The most difficult task facing the NOPD is gaining enhanced involvement of the community in reducing the number and rate of homicides. The plan demonstrates a clear understanding of this. What is needed now are comprehensive efforts of the kind we note above. Every district and office must work to achieve this goal with the same intensity and success that is happening in some parts of the department.

We realize that in this report we have recommended a formidable agenda for a department that is already facing many challenges. However, we are optimistic that the department can be successful. It has superb leadership; dedicated personnel who want to make the NOPD better; cooperation from local, state, and federal criminal justice agencies; and growing support from the community. The need is for continuity, time, and resources.

SUGGESTED RESOURCES

Resource List

1. Training and Professional Associations

International Association of Crime Analysts (IACA)—This organization offers training and resources, including an annual meeting to be held in September 2011. <http://www.iaca.net/>

National Institute of Justice's (NIJ) Mapping and Analysis for Public Safety (MAPS) program hosts an annual Crime Mapping Research Conference.

Crime and Place-Based Solutions 2011: 11th Crime Mapping Research Conference will be held on April 13–15, 2011, in Miami, Florida. <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/maps/>

2. Academic Resources

The Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy (CEBCP) at George Mason University. <http://gunston.gmu.edu/cebcp/>

Faculty at the CEBCP have created a searchable matrix of research-based policing practices. This matrix can help identify effective strategies within varied community contexts. <http://gunston.gmu.edu/cebcp/Matrix.html>

The Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment
<http://www.temple.edu/cj/footpatrolproject/>

National Institute of Justice
http://nij.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/Pub_search.aspx?searchtype=basic&category=99&location=top&PSID=58

3. Sample Crime Analysis Products—Police and IACA

Tampa, Florida, Police Department
http://www.tampagov.net/dept_Police/information_resources/Crime_Statistics/index.asp?sitemenuhide=y

The International Association of Crime Analysts (IACA)
http://www.iaca.net/DevCtr_Products.asp

PSN Resources

- New Orleans will be invited to participate in BJA-sponsored training on Homicide Incident Reviews. This is based on the PSN-related Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission (contact either the Michigan State University PSN TA team or Dr. Mallory O'Brien, Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission, mobrie@milwaukee.gov).

- New Orleans will also be invited to participate in PSN Strategic Problem Solving and Research Integration Training (contact Michigan State University PSN TA team).
- New Orleans is currently signed up to participate in the BJA-sponsored Drug Market Intervention (DMI) training initiative (contact Michigan State University PSN TA team). A video describing DMI is available along with other resources at: <http://www1.cj.msu.edu/~outreach/psn/DMI/default.htm>.
- A wide variety of PSN communication resources are available. The Law Enforcement Coordinator in the U.S. Attorney's Office should have access, or contact the Michigan State University PSN TA team.
- PSN case studies describing much of the above are available on the national PSN Web site and on the MSU Web site:
<http://www.psn.gov/about/index.html>
<http://www.cj.msu.edu/~outreach/psn/psnresources.html>

