



CITY OF NEW ORLEANS ETHICS REVIEW BOARD

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<https://www.nolaerb.gov/>

BOARD MEETING

The City of New Orleans Ethics Review Board will meet at City Council Chambers, New Orleans City Hall, 1300 Perdido St, New Orleans, LA 70112 on Tuesday, January 20, 2026, at 3:30 p.m.

AGENDA

1. Call to order.
2. Approval of the minutes of November 3, 2025, board meeting.
3. Monthly report of the Office of Inspector General.
4. Monthly report of the Office of the Independent Police Monitor.
5. Monthly report of the Ethics Trainer.
6. Monthly report of the General Counsel and Executive Administrator.
7. Discussion of reappointment/appointment schedule and process for IPM.
8. Discussion and vote to approve periodic salary adjustments for OIG and OIPM. *See* Item 1.
9. Discussion and vote to recommend that the City Council amend the Code of Ordinances to impose “restrictions on appointment” for the Independent Police Monitor similar to those imposed on the appointment of the Inspector General. *See* Item 2.
 - a. The current IG Ordinance provides for the following restrictions on appointment. *See* City of New Orleans Code of Ordinances, art. XIII § 2-1120(3)(d) ([ARTICLE XIII. - OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL \(OIG\) | Code of Ordinances | New Orleans, LA | Municode Library](#)).
 - i. A former or current elected official or employee of New Orleans city government, including a former or current elected official or employee of governmental entities that receive funds directly or indirectly from the city or its citizens, may not be appointed inspector general within four years following the end of such individual's period of service. This restriction shall not prohibit the reappointment of an inspector general currently holding the position of New Orleans Inspector General.
 1. Notwithstanding the foregoing restriction, employees of the office

of inspector general who have served in the office for two or more years may be immediately eligible for appointment to the position of inspector general.

ii. A former or current elected official or employee of the state or its political subdivisions may not be appointed inspector general within two years following that individual's period of service.

1. Notwithstanding the foregoing restriction, employees of the office of inspector general of the state or its political subdivisions who have served in any such office for two or more years may be immediately eligible for appointment to the position of inspector general.

iii. The inspector general shall not hold, nor be a candidate for, any elective office while inspector general, or for four years thereafter. The inspector general shall not hold office in any political party or political committee, nor shall he/she participate in any political campaign of any candidate for public office, nor make any campaign contribution or campaign endorsement, while inspector general.

1. An officer or employee of the office of the inspector general shall not hold, or be a candidate for, any elective office while an officer or employee, or for four years thereafter. An officer or employee of the office of the inspector general shall not hold office in any political party or political committee, or participate in any political campaign of any candidate for public office, or make any campaign contribution or campaign endorsement, while an officer or employee of the office of inspector general.

b. The current IPM ordinance contains no similar restrictions. *See* City of New Orleans Code of Ordinances, art. XIII § 2-1121(1-24) (https://library.municode.com/la/new_orleans/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIICO_CH2AD_ARTXIVOFINPOMO_S2-1121OFINPOMO)

10. Executive session pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes section 42:17(A)(4) to discuss investigative proceedings regarding allegations of misconduct, namely, ERB Complaints No. 2025-07 and 2025-08. *See* Confidential Materials.

11. Discussion and vote on officers, including replacement of Chair Broussard on effective date of resignation.

12. Adjournment.

**Draft Minutes of
Previous Board
Meeting**



Ethics Review Board for the City of New Orleans

Board Meeting at Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, 526 Pine St., New Orleans, Louisiana, on Monday, November 3, 2025, at 3:30 P.M.

Minutes

1. *Call to Order.*
 - 1.1. The chair called the meeting to order at 3:34 p.m.
 - 1.2. Attendance
 - 1.2.1. ERB members present:
 - 1.2.1.1. Dawn Broussard, Chair
 - 1.2.1.2. Holly Callia
 - 1.2.1.3. Monique G. Doucette
 - 1.2.1.4. Patrice Sentino
 - 1.2.2. ERB members absent:
 - 1.2.2.1. Michael Bagneris
 - 1.2.2.2. Sally Richardson
 - 1.2.3. Staff member present: Dane S. Ciolino, Executive Administrator & General Counsel
 - 1.2.4. Staff member absent: Jordy Stiggs, Ethics Trainer.
 - 1.3. The agenda for the meeting is attached.
2. *Approval of Minutes.* Upon a duly made and seconded motion, the ERB unanimously approved the minutes of the regular ERB meeting held on September 15, 2025.

3. *Monthly Report of the Office of the Inspector General.*
 - 3.1. The board accepted Mr. Michel's monthly report (attached).
 - 3.2. The OIG was represented by staff members from the OIG and general counsel Michael Laughlin; Mr. Michel is on vacation.
 - 3.3. The OIG noted that the city is finally collecting fines from illegal AirBnB operators.
 - 3.4. The OIG noted that it is looking into NOPD overtime practices. The office expects to issue a report in a few weeks and to do a "deeper dive" in the months to come.
 - 3.5. The OIG reported on the Safety and Permits recommendations made by the OIG. The recommendations are sound but must be implemented. There is a "bad environment" that needs to be addressed by having internal controls and by following other recommendations.
 - 3.6. The OIG reported that Tyrell Morris was recently sentenced to approximately one year in prison. Further, Mr. Willis, a tow truck driver, was arrested for taking money from people whose cars were towed. Through social media outreach, the OIG is identifying additional wrongdoing by him.
 - 3.7. The OIG reported that it recently wrapped up another citizens academy.
 - 3.8. The OIG noted that the city council asked it to investigate the situation surrounding the current budget crisis. The Legislative Auditor will look into the budgeting process and related issues.
 - 3.9. The OIG noted that there are four ongoing prosecutions that it is involved with, including prosecutions by the Office of the US Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana, Office of the Louisiana Attorney General, and the Orleans Parish District Attorney.
4. *Monthly Report of the Office of Independent Police Monitor.*
 - 4.1. The board did not receive Ms. Cziment's monthly report. This was due to the early meeting date this month. She will circulate a report to the board in the next day or so.
 - 4.2. The OIPM was represented by Ms. Cziment.
 - 4.3. Ms. Cziment reported on two recent "critical incidents" involving injuries of those in NOPD custody.
 - 4.4. Ms. Cziment noted that the head of NOPD Homicide appeared on her podcast to provide the public with information regarding that unit's work.

- 4.5. Ms. Cziment noted that her office has recently rented three billboards in the city to advertise her office's 24-hour hotline. The billboards call for reports of both positive and problematic NOPD conduct.
 - 4.6. In October, most of her team went to Minneapolis to attend a police oversight national conference. This conference addressed AI, social media, the First Amendment, and other current topics of interest to those engaged in police oversight.
 - 4.7. In October, the OIPM awarded its first award to an NOPD recruit for excellence in constitutional policing.
 - 4.8. Later this week, the OIPM is presenting its budget to the city council. Her office will receive a smaller appropriation and will pivot to adjust.
 - 4.9. Ms. Callia asked whether there is a possibility of no sustainment period of the court dismisses the litigation. Ms. Cziment replied that it is possible that there will be no ongoing sustainment period. Ms. Cziment also noted that her office has decided not to take on audit checks or other sustainment duties that are not within her office's traditional responsibilities.
5. *Monthly Report of the Ethics Trainer*
- 5.1. The board accepted Mr. Stiggs's monthly report (attached).
 - 5.2. Mr. Stiggs attended the meeting.
 - 5.3. Mr. Stiggs reminded board members that there are 51 days remaining for board members to obtain training.
 - 5.4. Mr. Stiggs requested feedback and suggestions regarding proposed posters to provide information to city employees around the holiday season.
 - 5.5. The board told Mr. Stiggs that there are no monetary or budgetary restraints on distributing posters and flyers to city employees.
 - 5.6. Mr. Stiggs noted that the board will revive the ethics awards for city employees, namely the "Liaison Award" and the "Torch Award." He distributed criteria for the awards.
6. *Report of the Executive Administrator and General Counsel.*
- 6.1. The board accepted Mr. Ciolino's monthly report (attached).
 - 6.2. Mr. Ciolino reported that one board position (Dillard) still needs to be filled by the mayor's office. Valerie Bouldin of the mayor's office reported that no appointment is likely to occur this calendar year during the Cantrell administration.

- 6.3. Mr. Ciolino reported that the City Council and mayor still need to appoint members to the QARAC for the OIPM. The ERB made its appointments many months ago.
- 6.4. The QARAC for the OIG is finishing up its work and will soon hold a public hearing.
7. *Discussion and Vote to Approve or to Amend Payroll/Administrative Procedures for Processing ADP Payroll for the Following: Executive Administrator, Inspector General, Independent Police Monitor, and Ethics Trainer.*
 - 7.1. The board considered the problem discussed in the memorandum with Mr. Ciolino, Mr. Michel, and Mr. Laughlin.
 - 7.2. The Board voted unanimously to permit the Board Chair and Executive Administrator to continue approving timesheets of the EA, IG, IPM, and Ethics Trainer that reflect only hours of “availability” and not hours actually worked.
 - 7.2.1. The Board did so in accordance with CAO Pol. Mem. No. 72(R) (Aug. 25, 2015) (“Payroll Time Keeping Procedures”).
 - 7.2.2. This CAO policy memorandum provides that as to exempt executive, administrative and professional employees (EAPs), each EAP employee reports “time and attendance at the end of each pay period, and, in so doing, are confirming that they were available to work for the entire pay period, apart from days when leave was used.” In contrast, hourly, nonexempt employees report actual “time and attendance at the end of each pay period.”
8. *Periodic Salary Adjustments for OIG and OIPM Discussion.*
 - 8.1. Mr. Ciolino will obtain salary information to the board before the next board meeting.
 - 8.2. The board voted to defer this discussion until the December board meeting.
9. *Discussion of Limitations on Appointment of Independent Police Monitor*
 - 9.1. Board voted to defer this to the next meeting. The vote was unanimous.
 - 9.2. Board requested some legislative history behind the change. Board also requested that Ms. Cziment share her thoughts on the proposal with the board.
10. *Executive Session Pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 42:17(A)(4) to Discuss Investigative Proceedings Regarding Allegations of Misconduct, Namely, ERB Complaint No. 2025-06 Through 2025-07.*
 - 10.1. The board went into executive session at 5:01 p.m.

- 10.2. The board went into general session at 5:43 p.m.
11. *Disposition of Complaints*
 - 11.1. 2025-03a. NORD extra-marital affair anonymous complaint. Referred to OIG. Two subjects interviewed. Report from OIG received. The board voted unanimously to dismiss the complaint for lack of a factual basis based on investigative report from the OIG.
 - 11.2. 2025-03b: NORD nepotism allegations. Referred to OIG. Report from OIG received. The board voted unanimously to dismiss the complaint for lack of a factual basis based on investigative report from the OIG.
 - 11.3. 2025-06. The board voted unanimously to dismiss the complaint because state ethics board handling. Lack of jurisdiction.
 - 11.4. 2025-07. The board voted unanimously to request a response and additional information from respondent.
12. *Adjournment.*
 - 12.1. A motion was made to adjourn the ERB meeting.
 - 12.2. The motion was seconded.
 - 12.3. The ERB unanimously voted to adjourn. The meeting was adjourned at 5:36 p.m.

* END *

**Monthly Report of
OIG**

MONTHLY REPORT

DECEMBER 2025



OIG

**NEW ORLEANS
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

**EDWARD MICHEL, CIG
INSPECTOR GENERAL**

ADMINISTRATION DIVISION



2,080

Number of registered X followers

ADMINISTRATION

The Office Manager is responsible for the following:

- Human Resources
- Finance
- Procurement Process
- Operations

INFORMATION SECURITY

The OIG Information Security Specialist is responsible for maintaining the OIG's information technology (IT) integrity through:

- Technical Support
- Hardware and Software Updates
- Communication and Coordination
- Consultation for IT Purchases


COMMUNICATIONS

The Public Information Officer is responsible for the following:

- Public and Media Relations
- Social Media
- Monthly and Annual Reports to the ERB
- Editing | Writing | Reviewing

AUDIT & REVIEW DIVISION

The **Audit and Review Division** conducts financial audits, attestations, compliance, and performance audits of City programs and operations. Auditors test for appropriate internal controls and compliance with laws, regulations, and other requirements.



The Audit and Review Division has the following projects in process:

- NOAB Contract Audit
- EMS Response Time
- New Orleans Recreation Department Maintenance Audit
- Non-profit Property Tax Exemptions

Project Phase Descriptions:

Planning - includes background research, data gathering, initial interviews, and/or internal controls assessment.

Fieldwork - includes data and statistical analyses, interviews, testing of procedures, onsite observations, and/or physical inspections.

Draft Report - includes data and statistical reviews, documenting fieldwork results, initial report writing, revisions, and internal Quality Assurance Review (QAR) prior to supervisory review.

Supervisory Review - includes the review by both Deputy Inspector General and First Assistant Inspector General to ensure sufficiency and appropriateness of evidence, adequate fieldwork procedures, and proper conclusions, content, presentation, and readability.

Legal Review - Report review by in-house General Counsel and/or outside Legal Counsel to ensure appropriate and proper legal citations and/or interpretations.

IG Review - Report review by the Inspector General based on corrections and recommended changes resulting from the Legal Review.

30-Day Comment Period - 30-day deadline for the department to review the draft report and submit management responses for inclusion in the final report.

MEASURING PROGRESS

AUDIT AND REVIEW DIVISION

The following information provides a summary of the Audit Division's project phase and a summary of the audit objectives.

Project Name	Project Phase ¹	Anticipated ² Completion Date
NOAB Contract Audit	30-Day Review	Ongoing
Summary of Objectives: The purpose of the audit is to verify NOAB management compliance with relevant policies and procedures while procuring professional services contracts and assess the effectiveness of NOAB management controls in ensuring vendor compliance with contract terms.		
EMS Response Time	Supervisory Review	Ongoing
Summary of Objectives: The purpose of the audit is to determine whether the City is responding to medical emergencies timely and in accordance with their policies and national standards.		
New Orleans Recreation Department Maintenance Audit	Fieldwork	Ongoing
Summary of Objectives: The objective of the audit is to determine whether NORD maintained their facilities in accordance with policy and best practices.		
Non-profit Property Tax Exemptions	Fieldwork	Ongoing
Summary of Objectives: The objective of the audit is to determine if the City is adequately verifying the eligibility of non-profits exempt from paying property taxes, as well as to determine if organizations are improperly included as exempt.		

Footnotes:

1 - Project phase determination is based on the objective(s), scope, and methodology for each project. It is not determined by a standard set of hours and/or phase deadline.


2 - The completion date may be re-evaluated if necessary.

INSPECTIONS & EVALUATIONS DIVISION

The **Inspections and Evaluations Division** works to increase the efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, and accountability of City programs, agencies, and operations. Evaluators conduct independent, objective, empirically based and methodically sound inspections, evaluations, and performance reviews.

NEW HIRE: Adam Bradley joins OIG

The OIG is excited to welcome **Adam Bradley** to our team. Adam began his role as an OIG Evaluator in November 2025, bringing years of experience in nonprofit administration and public health research and evaluation. He holds a Master of Public Health as well as Bachelor's degrees in Biology and Spanish. He is fluent in Spanish.



The Inspections & Evaluations Division has the following projects in process:

- NORD Booster Clubs and Athletic Teams Resources
- Traffic Camera Safety Program Follow-Up
- Equipment Maintenance Division Fleet Management
- NOPD Overtime

Project Phase Descriptions:

Planning - includes background research, data gathering, initial interviews, and/or internal controls assessment.

Fieldwork - includes data and statistical analyses, interviews, testing of procedures, onsite observations, and/or physical inspections.

Draft Report - includes data and statistical reviews, documenting fieldwork results, initial report writing, revisions and internal Quality Assurance Review (QAR) prior to supervisory review.

Supervisory Review - includes the review by both Deputy Inspector General and First Assistant Inspector General to ensure sufficiency and appropriateness of evidence, adequate fieldwork procedures, and proper conclusions, content, presentation and readability.

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IG Review - Report review by the Inspector General based on corrections and recommended changes resulting from the Legal Review.

30-Day Comment Period - 30-day deadline for the department to review the draft report and submit management responses for inclusion in the final report.

MEASURING PROGRESS

INSPECTIONS AND EVALUATIONS DIVISION

The following information provides a summary of the Inspections and Evaluations Division's project phase and a summary of each project's objectives.

Project Name	Project Phase ¹	Anticipated ² Completion Date
NORD Booster Clubs and Athletic Teams Resources	Fieldwork	Ongoing
Summary of Objectives: To determine whether NORD has sufficient controls in place to ensure that teams comply with NORD policies and with the law as well as to assess whether NORD's youth athletics registration fee policies and procedures result in equitable and consistent opportunities for the City's youth.		
Traffic Camera Safety Program Follow-Up	Completed	Jan. 8, 2026
Summary of Objectives: To determine whether the City adopted the changes recommended in the OIG's 2020 report Management and Operations of the Traffic Camera Safety Program.		
Equipment Maintenance Division Fleet Management	Fieldwork	Ongoing
Summary of Objectives: To determine if the EMD has policies and procedures to adequately maintain, inventory, and surplus City equipment in an efficient and effective manner.		
NOPD Overtime	IG Review	Ongoing
Summary of Objectives: To determine whether NOPD policies and procedures for overtime are consistent with best practices and effective in preventing payroll fraud.		

Footnotes:

1 - Project phase determination is based on the objective(s), scope, and methodology for each project. It is not determined by a standard set of hours and/or phase deadline.

2 - The completion date may be re-evaluated if necessary.

INVESTIGATION DIVISION

ONGOING PROSECUTIONS:

The Investigation Division continues to assist in the criminal prosecutions of Mayor LaToya Cantrell and Jeffrey Vappie, Leessa Augustine, Gabriel Thomas, and Michael Willis Jr.

Updates include the following:

Augustine, a former New Orleans SWBNO Senior Special Agent and reserve NOPD officer, was sentenced Dec. 16, 2025, to six months of home detention to be followed by five years' supervised release and \$94,972 in restitution. Augustine pled guilty in June 2025 to two counts of wire fraud relating to an emergency benefit, one count of wire fraud affecting a financial institution, and one count of making false statements to investigators.

Thomas, a former SWBNO employee, was appointed a new attorney in late 2025, which pushed back his court proceedings. His pre-trial hearings were moved to Jan. 26, 2026, and his trial date was moved to Feb. 9, 2026. Thomas was arrested by Louisiana State Police Troop NOLA in December 2024 as part of a joint investigation into brass and copper thefts from SWBNO.

An indictment is merely a charge and the guilt of the defendant must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

BY THE NUMBERS

As of **Dec. 15**, the Investigation Division had received four complaints, opened three investigations, and made three records requests. Five search warrants have been obtained.

***Investigation Division numbers are the latest available as of report date.**

2025 BUDGET

Total 2025 Appropriation \$ 4,488,636

Expenditures	Spent YTD
Personnel	\$ 3,248,388
Operating	\$ 506,954
Total	\$ 3,755,342
Remaining Balance	\$ 733,294

SOCIAL MEDIA



Facebook: @NewOrleansOIG



X: @NOLAOIG



New Orleans Office of Inspector General

December 23, 2025 at 12:47 PM · 🌐

This week, the U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Louisiana, announced the sentencing of former New Orleans Sewerage & Water Board senior special agent and New Orleans Police Department reserve officer Leessa Augustine in connection with multiple fraud schemes.

We are grateful to the U.S. Attorney's Office for its pursuit of justice in this case.

It is our duty at the Office of Inspector General to ensure that public officials uphold their responsibilities with integrity. The OIG will continue to pursue accountability for those who misuse their public positions for personal gain. The citizens of New Orleans deserve nothing less.



JUSTICE.GOV

Former Sewerage & Water Board Special Agent Sentenced for Multiple Fraud Schemes



New Orleans OIG @NOLAOIG · Dec 23, 2025

This week, @EDLanews announced the sentencing of former Sewerage & Water Board special agent and NOPD reserve officer Leessa Augustine in connection with multiple fraud schemes. We are grateful to the U.S. Attorney's Office for its pursuit of justice in this case.

Former Sewerage & Water Board Special Agent Sentenced for Multiple Fraud Schemes

Monday, December 22, 2025

Share

For Immediate Release

U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Louisiana
brimmy.lmainque@usdoj.gov

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA – Acting United States Attorney Michael M. Simpson announced that **LEESSA AUGUSTINE** ("AUGUSTINE") age 47, a resident of New Orleans, was sentenced on December 16, 2025, for charges related to her involvement in fraud schemes while employed as a Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans ("SWB") Senior Special Agent, a position that tasked her with investigating the alleged misconduct of other Sewerage & Water Board employees.

United States District Judge Greg Gerard Guidry sentenced **AUGUSTINE** to 6 months' home detention to be followed by five years' supervised release and \$94,972 in restitution.

AUGUSTINE sentence was imposed on her guilty pleas to three counts of Wire Fraud and one count of making False Statements for lying to investigators. In one scheme, **AUGUSTINE**, who was also a New Orleans Police Department reserve officer, billed a police detail

SOCIAL MEDIA



Instagram: @NewOrleansOIG

Part 1: Background



Today, the OIG released a

Part 2: Findings



OIG investigators

Part 3: Recommendation



deserve

 neworleansoig The New Orleans OIG has released a public letter finding no evidence of cheating or bias in the New Orleans Police Department's (NOPD) 2024 promotional exams for Captain and Major positions.

While overall findings were announced earlier this year, today's letter provides further details on the OIG's investigation as well as guidance for strengthening the NOPD's promotional process.

For details, see the video above!

In addition, a review of metadata associated with this investigation prompted the opening of another investigation involving lack of candor and failure to cooperate in an OIG investigation. Stay tuned for that investigation's findings, to be released in the coming weeks.

20

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20

SOCIAL MEDIA



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Office of Inspector General City of New Orleans

328 followers

1 mo •

The OIG Fraud Tip of the Month for December focuses on employee payroll fraud. According to the U.S. Department of Justice OIG and ARA Fraud and Forensic Services, indicators of potential payroll fraud include the items listed below.

To report fraud, waste, and abuse by City government or City contractors, contact the New Orleans OIG at 504-681-3247 or <https://lnkd.in/gU2z2vVY>.

#NolaOIG #FraudTipOfTheMonth

NEW ORLEANS OIG

FIGHTING FRAUD TIP OF THE MONTH

SIGNS OF PAYROLL FRAUD

These may include:

- Inaccurate, corrected, or missing time cards.
- Excessive overtime or splitting overtime between pay periods to avoid biweekly pay limit caps.
- Unusual spikes in overtime or bonuses.
- Multiple employees with the same bank account number.
- A terminated employee who is still on the payroll list.
- An employee who is on the payroll but not on the agency's employee list.
- An employee who has been paid for working more than 24 hours in one day.




**Monthly Report of
OIPM**


OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE MONITOR

MONTHLY COMMUNITY REPORT

December 2025



Transparency. Accountability. Respect.



LETTER TO THE COMMUNITY



Dear New Orleans Community,

During December, the Office of the Independent Police Monitor (OIPM) reflected on the year's end and started to look into our future. I am currently writing this letter during our **four days of reflection and mourning to mark the year anniversary of the New Year Eve's terrorist attack on Bourbon Street**. The OIPM extends our support to the survivors and the families and loved ones of those who died on Bourbon Street last year. I was on call that day, and I can say that standing at the intersection of Bourbon and Bienville was overwhelming and painful - and even reflecting on that day now is difficult.

The OIPM thanks the officers who ran towards the danger on January 1, 2025, the officers, medical personnel and bystanders who provided medical assistance, the officers who helped crowds disperse, and then tried to unite friends and families who were separated, the officers who then continued to serve New Orleanians for the rest of the day - despite the things they lived through just hours earlier. On behalf of the OIPM, I hope you treat yourself with kindness, empathy and patience during these days of reflection. If you or someone you know may need or want assistance, you can access **wraparound free trauma recovery** care from Seeds of NOLA at (504) 702-4335. Please visit crimesurvivorsnola.org for more information and to access the Crime Survivors Guidebook to learn more about resources that may be available to you.

On December 7, 2025, I along with our Deputy, Kirschelle Williams, attended the **Memorial Inspection and Mass** in remembrance of our fallen first responders. This annual event is an opportunity for all first responders in the city to come together in support.

In response to ongoing questions from the public regarding how NOPD may interact with ICE, the OIPM released our third edition of the series "**Baton Rouge Check In with the IPM.**" In the post, the OIPM explained legislation passed in 2025 and implemented on August 1, 2025 affecting policing in the state of Louisiana. This post focused on Act 399 which was signed into law amending La R.S. § 14:130.1: Obstruction of Justice and La R.S. § 14:134: Malfeasance in Office. This post explains the law, the background for the law, and highlights how this creates new directives for police officers in Louisiana.

Looking to the year ahead, in the coming month, the OIPM will release our **2026 Work Plan**. Each January, the OIPM releases a work plan outlining our goals for the year. This plan serves as a roadmap to guide our efforts, helping us prioritize where we can best fulfill our mission, provide oversight, and serve the community. We look forward to sharing this document with you soon.

Thank you for your continued support and let's stay safe,

Stella Cziment

Stella Cziment, Independent Police Monitor

Above, the OIPM attends the Memorial Inspection and Mass in Jackson Square.

Below, are some of the slides of the informative post the OIPM created to explain requirements around the NOPD's interactions with ICE.

Baton Rouge Check In with the IPM
 Office of the Independent Police Monitor
 www.nolaipm.gov | 504.309.9799
 Let's talk about Act 399 that amended La R.S. § 14:130.1: Obstruction of Justice and La R.S. § 14:134: Malfeasance in Office

Dinstause (name Excellent!)
 Police Monitor
 309.9799

Commonly Asked Question: What About First Amendment Protected Acts - Are Those Hinderances?
 The current understanding is that Act 399 will not apply to individuals participating in First Amendment protected activities such as protesting and recording the police.
 It is unclear if this includes acts like blowing whistles to warn of the approach of ICE.
 The OIPM cannot provide legal guidance on this matter.

Background to the Law
 When Senator Morris introduced SB 15 before the Senate Committee, he stated he wrote this bill because of media Morris had seen from around the nation about public officials saying they would not work with ICE.
 Morris also said he had seen quotes from officials in Louisiana saying they would not work with ICE, but Morris declined to name specific people or institutions.
 This law makes it a crime: (1) if state actors (elected officials, government employees or police) do not cooperate with ICE; or (2) if anyone interferes with or hinders federal immigration proceedings / operations.

ACHIEVEMENTS, UPDATES, & WORK

OIPM Leads Training on Misconduct Investigations and Role of Oversight in Force Investigations

In December, Independent Police Monitor, Stella Cziment, led a training for officers responsible for initiating disciplinary investigations into potential misconduct that they observe in their platoons or in their district. Stella discussed the role of oversight in monitoring and reviewing formal disciplinary investigations and in use of force investigation scenes and investigations.



OIPM Discusses Training Priorities and Training Videos with the NOPD Academy and Training Advisory Committees

What videos should be watched by recruits and during in-service trainings? What should our training priorities be for the coming year? This month, the OIPM participated in the Training Advisory Committee meeting and the Training Video Advisory Committee meeting where we discussed the answers to those questions. At the Training Video Advisory Committee meeting, the OIPM sat alongside NOPD Academy staff and instructors and leadership in the Force Investigation Team and the Public Integrity Bureau as we reviewed In Car Camera and Body Worn Camera footage of taser deployments. After each video, the group discussed if the footage should be used for training purposes - to teach what to do or what not to do, when to deploy a taser and when not to deploy, and how to properly utilize that equipment and how not to utilize the equipment. Additionally, the group flagged any other risk, legal, or training concerns from the video requiring additional follow up from the Academy.



December on the Monitor's Mic

This month on the Monitor's Mic, the OIPM hosted three guests with unique expertise in law enforcement and law enforcement best practices. On December 5th, the Monitor's Mic interviewed **Jason Armstrong, a former Chief of Police and a nationally recognized expert in policing.** We discussed Chief Armstrong's long and impressive career--most notably his appointment as the Chief of Police in Ferguson, Missouri five years after the police killing of Michael Brown, Jr. In Ferguson, Chief Armstrong led reform efforts in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Justice while the department was under a Consent Decree. We asked Chief Armstrong about what he has learned while rebuilding after a crisis, implementing reforms, and creating community accountability. Chief Armstrong also talked about his career after his time in Ferguson which has brought him back to his home state of North Carolina.

Next, on December 19th, the Monitor's Mic spoke with **Major Lejon Roberts and Captain Preston Bax of NOPD's Special Operations Division (SOD).** We talked to the Major and Captain about the makeup of SOD and what units and specialties are contained within it. We asked how SOD work is different from the district stations within NOPD and about misconceptions people may have about SWAT. Both Major Roberts and Captain Bax discussed the training required for an officer to be admitted to SOD--be it in SWAT, the K9 unit, crisis negotiation, or bomb disposal. The Major and Captain explained when a situation warrants SOD's involvement and how SOD is activated with NOPD. We also asked Major Roberts and Captain Bax to fill us in on some of the equipment that SOD uses, how SOD reviews it's operations, high-risk warrants, inter-agency partnerships, and how SOD's officers cope with the intense, high-stress nature of the job.



OIPM Office of the Independent Police Monitor
www.nolaipm.gov | 504.309.9799

THE MONITOR'S MIC

Where we talk oversight, policing, and you

Guest of the Week:
Chief Jason Armstrong

Tune in to the Monitor's Mic on Friday, 12/5, to hear from Chief Armstrong - a leader in policing. Chief Armstrong is a retired police chief who served in Georgia, Missouri, and North Carolina. Most notably, Chief Armstrong was appointed police chief in Ferguson, Missouri, five years after the police killing of Michael Brown Jr. Listen in as Chief Armstrong talks about his career leading police departments, his work in Consent Decree reform, change management, and community accountability.

A call in talk radio show
WBOK 1230 AM
Airing Fridays at Noon
Call: (504) 582-9422



Chief Jason Armstrong, Retired Police Chief



Stella Cziment, Independent Police Monitor



Katherine Williams, Deputy Police Monitor



WHO WE ARE

The OIPM is an independent, civilian police oversight agency created by voters in a 2008 charter referendum. Its mission is to improve police service to the community, community trust in the NOPD, and officer safety and working conditions. Since first opening its doors in August 2009, the Office of the Independent Police Monitor has been responsible for representing the community of New Orleans, providing accountability and oversight to the NOPD, and assisting in the reforms required under the Federal Consent Decree.

The OIPM is protected and required by City Charter and Ordinance. The OIPM operates through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the City of New Orleans and the New Orleans Police Department and has distinct responsibilities outlined by ordinance. This means this office was created by the people of New Orleans to represent all people interacting with the New Orleans Police Department to improve the way our community is policed.

Ensuring Compliance and Reform

- The OIPM reviews the NOPD's policies, practices, and investigations to ensure that every action taken is compliant with local, state, and federal law, and Consent Decree reforms.
- The OIPM advises on policy, tactics, training, and supervision to ensure that the NOPD is adopting national best practice and building a nondiscriminatory, safe, effective, and respectful police department that is responsive to the needs of the community and their employees.
- The OIPM does this through monitoring, case reviews, audits, and policy recommendations.

Amplifying the Needs of the Community

- The OIPM engages with the community to ensure that they both know about our services and understand how the police department works. Through providing information, the OIPM is equipping and empowering the community to navigate police encounters safely and demand what they need.
- Provides Complaint Intake.
- Operates the Community-Police Mediation Program.
- Partners with Families Overcoming Injustice.
- Coordinates public forums and outreach opportunities for the community to provide vital input on the way they are policed.

Making the NOPD a Safer and Nondiscriminatory Workplace

- The OIPM provides recommendations and assessments to ensure that the NOPD is a safe and nondiscriminatory work place for all employees.
- The OIPM assesses supervision and training to ensure that employees are being equipped and supported.
- The OIPM meets with police associations to hear concerns from their membership.
- The OIPM monitors disciplinary hearings to ensure that discipline is consistent and nonretaliatory.
- The OIPM receives commendations and accounts of positive policing from the community.



WHAT DO WE DO?

Mission, Vision, Work

We serve the community, ensure police transparency, compliance, and accountability, and make policing a safer and more rewarding employment experience.

WHAT WE DO



Misconduct Complaints



Disciplinary Proceedings



Data Analysis



Community Outreach



Use of Force



Community-Police Mediation Program



Audits and Policy



Commendations

The OIPM is the oversight body for the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD). The OIPM provides oversight through monitoring, reviewing, and auditing police activity and data. The OIPM is responsible for conducting complaint and commendation intake, on-scene monitoring of critical incidents and uses of force, overseeing the community-officer mediation program, reviewing investigations, providing assessments, identifying patterns, and making recommendations for improved practice, policy, resource allocation, and training.

The OIPM envisions a police force where the community is a valued and respected partner in public safety and law enforcement. This is achieved through:

- Assurance of transparency, accountability, and fairness within the NOPD and in all policing practices
- Community-driven policing policy that reflects the changing and dynamic needs of New Orleanians
- Continued efforts to engage the community and collaborate with community partners
- Recruitment and retention of a police force that is representative of and responsive to the community it serves
- Utilization of de-escalation techniques and methods when responding to calls of service
- Conducting only lawful and necessary arrests free of discriminatory practices
- Thorough and effective investigations resulting in appropriate arrests and prosecutions
- Clear and professional communication with victims and witnesses of crime and all that come into contact with the NOPD
- Responsible utilization of equipment and allocation of resources
- Development of highly trained supervisors and organizational leadership
- Interactions with the public and internally within the police force that are based in mutual trust and respect

The OIPM seeks to amplify the voice of the community to ensure that all within the city – visitors and residents alike – can access police services equally and have a positive experience with officers.

DATA OVERALL: YEAR TO DATE AND MONTH

	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	Avg 2017-2024
Civilian Complaint Count	63	103	110	74	63	65	102	38	43	74.75
Police Complaint Count	3	1	2	1	5	6	2	5	3	3.13
Civilian w/in NOPD	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0.38
Anonymous Complaint	22	26	22	27	21	29	0	0	0	15.63
Community Liaison Count	20	13	30	26	20	43	17	8	7	20.50
Case Monitoring Count	7	5	4	7	5	12	0	10	8	6.38
Case Review Count	0	0	1	4	5	3	9	8	1	3.88
Contact Only Count	44	108	66	34	17	29	23	2	9	36.00
Disciplinary Hearing Count	47	49	43	67	71	64	61	66	35	57.00
Critical Incident Count	12	8	5	6	8	11	10	7	7	7.75
Firearm Discharge Count	9	8	6	7	7	9	9	4	4	6.75
Lvl 4 Non-Critical	15	17	10	18	9	12	0	0	0	8.25
Force Monitoring*	2	5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.75
Mediation Count	34	33	28	25	23	38	38	23	31	29.88
Commendation Count	2	8	6	2	8	3	7	1	2	4.63
Grand Total	280	384	335	298	263	325	278	172	150	276

	Dec 2025	Dec 2024	Dec 2023	Dec 2022	Dec 2021	Dec 2020	Dec 2019	Dec 2018	Dec 2017	2017-2024 Average
Citizen Complaint Count	8	5	3	3	4	4	17	6	6	6.00
Police Complaint Count	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0.25
Civilian w/in NOPD	0	0	1	0	0	0				0.20
Anonymous Complaint	1	1	2	1	0	1				1.00
Community Case Liaison Count	2	0	2	2	0	3	0	0	0	0.88
Case Monitoring Count	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.13
Case Review Count	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.13
Contact Only Count	3	6	9	3	0	0	5	0	0	2.88
Disciplinary Hearing Count	6	4	0	2	5	0	7	3	2	2.88
Critical Incident Count	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.38
Firearm Discharge Count	0	1	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.63
Lvl 4 Non-Critical	0	0	1	0	0	2				0.60
Force Monitoring*	0	0	0							0.00
Mediation Count	1	3	0	2	2	1	3	1	3	1.88
Commendation Count	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.38
Grand Total	22	22	22	15	13	12	35	10	11	17.50
Community Outreach Events	5	5	4	5	5					

*indicates a new category or a category that was not always captured by OIPM

CURRENT BUDGET



OIPM Budget Description	Amount
Personnel	\$905,785.00
Operating	\$400,000.00
2025 Total OIPM Budget	\$1,305,785.00
2025 Total OIPM Budget	\$1,305,785.00
Amounts Spent to Date:	\$1,084,357.00
Unexpended funds	\$221,428.00

MISCONDUCT WORK

Relevant Definitions

Complaint

A complaint is an allegation of misconduct filed against a NOPD officer(s) by a member of a public or civilian (external) or another officer (internal). A complaint may concern an action or lack of action taken by a NOPD officer(s), an interaction with a NOPD officer, or a witnessed interaction with a NOPD officer.

Complainant

A complainant is the individual who files a complaint against a NOPD officer(s). A complainant may be generated internally (by another officer or a supervisor) or externally (by a member of a public). The complainant does not need to be personally affected by the incident.

OIPM Complaint Codes

When the OIPM receives a complaint referral, the OIPM organizes the complaint according to the source of the complaint.

- Civilian based complaints are classified as: CC.
- Complaints from police officers are classified as: PO.
- Complaints from civilians working within the NOPD are classified as: CN.
- Anonymous complaints are classified as: AC.

Misconduct

Officer action or failure to take action that violates any rule, policy, procedure, order, verbal or written instruction of the NOPD or is a violation of any city ordinance, state or federal criminal law. Misconduct includes, but is not limited to:


- Use of Force
- Abuse of Authority such as unlawful searches and seizures, premises enter and search, no warrant, threat to notify child services, threats to damage of property, etc., refusal to take complaint, refuse to identify themselves, damages to property seized
- Failure to supervise
- Falsification of records
- Inappropriate language or attitude
- Harassment
- Interference with Constitutional rights
- Neglect of duty
- Discrimination in the provision of police services or other discriminatory conduct on the basis of race, colors, creed, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation
- Theft
- Retaliation for filing complaint with NOPD or the OIPM

Complaint Procedures

The OIPM does not verify the statements made during complaint intake or agree with the statements provided by the complainant. The OIPM strives to accurately capture the words, emotions, goals and narrative shared by the complainant and selects the policy, practice, or rule that each allegation of behavior / incident could have violated if determined to be true. OIPM personnel may review information in NOPD systems regarding the interaction complained of, including body worn camera video, in car camera video, electronic police reports and field interview cards. The OIPM may include information obtained from NOPD information systems in the complaint referral.

The OIPM assesses whether in the information provided should be provided confidentially or if the OIPM would recommend covert operations conducted by the Special Investigation Squad (SIS). Anything shared in this report is public information.

Complaint Totals - December




9

**Total Complaints
Received this
month**


88

**Total Complaints
Received This
Year**

Complaint Intake Source - 2025




Complainant Type - 2025




Districts - Past 12 Months


This chart communicates where the alleged misconduct occurred by police district. This requires the misconduct to occur in a physical space (instead of an incident that occurs over the phone or internet for example). This is based on complainant disclosure and the OIPM tries to verify this information through electronic police reports, body worn camera footage, and field identification cards.



Complaint Type YTD - 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025




Complaint Totals YTD - 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025




DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

After the misconduct investigatory process, if the investigating officer sustained an allegation, then that allegation must be affirmed by NOPD leadership in order for that accused officer to be disciplined. This occurs through the disciplinary proceeding process. The disciplinary proceedings are conducted by the NOPD - either by Captains or Deputy-Chiefs. The OIPM monitors and assesses the efforts of NOPD to ensure all disciplinary investigations and proceedings are conducted in a manner that is non-retaliatory, impartial, fair, consistent, truthful, and timely in accordance with NOPD policies and law. Adjudication of misconduct is handled internally by the PIB or the Bureau of the officer / employee.



The OIPM may monitor the process conducted by the PIB or by the Bureau; however, under the MOU, there are detailed directions regarding how the OIPM is notified of investigations by the PIB and similar protocol does not currently exist for Bureaus. For that reason, the OIPM tends to be more involved with investigations and disciplinary proceedings conducted by the PIB. During every disciplinary proceeding, the OIPM remains in the room for deliberation with the NOPD leadership to give the hearing officers feedback and input. This process is how the OIPM provides our recommendations and feedback regarding the strength of the investigation, liability and risk management concerns, and areas where the policy required clarification or was being applied inconsistently. Though OIPM may provide this feedback in memorandums to the NOPD prior to the hearing or supplementing these hearings, these discussions during the deliberation process enable the NOPD to consider and digest our points before any final decision was made on the matter. These discussions are an opportunity for the OIPM to provide and receive insight into the NOPD investigation and often these comments lead to meaningful discussion with not just the hearing officers, but the assigned investigator on the case, since it was an opportunity for that investigator to explain investigatory decisions and to answer questions.

Disciplinary Proceedings - December



6

**Total
Disciplinary
Case Received
this Month**

OIPM tracks Disciplinary Proceedings based on the date notice is received from NOPD and not necessarily on when the disciplinary proceeding occurs. Additionally, this figure does not account for investigations in which multiple officers are accused, or for hearing notifications received in a prior year but rescheduled to the current month. These proceedings are often rescheduled for scheduling conflicts. Tracking by notification date allows for consistent and accurate data collection.

USE OF FORCE

Relevant Definitions

Critical Incident

Critical incidents are an internal definition that was agreed upon by the OIPM and the NOPD through the November 10, 2010 Memorandum of Understanding. This definition captures that the OIPM should be notified of deaths, certain levels of injuries, and officer involved shootings within an hour so the OIPM has the ability to monitor the on scene investigation by the Force Investigation Team. According to this shared definition, critical incidents are:

- All incidents including the use of deadly force by an NOPD officer including an Officer Involved Shooting (“OIS”);
- All uses of force by an NOPD officer resulting in an injury requiring hospitalization;
- All head and neck strikes with an impact weapon, whether intentional or not;
- All other uses of force by an NOPD officer resulting in death; and
- All deaths while the arrestee or detainee is in the custodial care of the NOPD.


Use of Force

Use of Force is when an officer uses physical contact on an individual during a civilian-police interaction. The force can be mild to severe based on the levels of force outlined in the NOPD policy. The force may be considered justified by NOPD policy considering the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time which would justify that appropriate physical contact based on how officers are trained to handle that interaction. Force will be assessed based on the type of contact utilized compared to the resistance encountered, resulting injuries, witness statements, officer statements, and evidence found.

Levels of Force

- **Level 1:** Includes pointing a firearm at a person and hand control or escort techniques (e.g., elbow grip, wrist grip, or shoulder grip) applied as pressure point compliance techniques that are not reasonably expected to cause injury; takedowns that do not result in actual injury or complaint of injury; and use of an impact weapon for non-striking purposes (e.g., prying limbs, moving or controlling a person) that does not result in actual injury or complaint of injury. It does not include escorting, touching, or handcuffing a person with minimal or no resistance.
- **Level 2:** Includes use of a CEW also known as “tasers” (including where a CEW is fired at a person but misses); and force that causes or could reasonably be expected to cause an injury greater than transitory pain but does not rise to a Level 3 use of force.
- **Level 3:** Includes any strike to the head (except for a strike with an impact weapon); use of impact weapons when contact is made (except to the head), regardless of injury; or the destruction of an animal.
- **Level 4:** Includes all ‘serious uses of force’ as listed below:
 - (a) All uses of lethal force by an NOPD officer;
 - (b) All critical firearm discharges by an NOPD officer;
 - (c) All uses of force by an NOPD officer resulting in serious physical injury or requiring hospitalization;
 - (d) All neck holds;
 - (e) All uses of force by an NOPD officer resulting in a loss of consciousness;
 - (f) All canine bites;
 - (g) More than two applications of a CEW on an individual during a single interaction, regardless of the mode or duration of the application, and whether the applications are by the same or different officers, or CEW application for 15 seconds or longer, whether continuous or consecutive;
 - (h) Any strike, blow, kick, CEW application, or similar use of force against a handcuffed subject; and
 - (i) Any vehicle pursuit resulting in death, serious physical injury or injuries requiring hospitalization.

Critical Incident / Use of Force Chain of Events




Use of Force Work

Use of Force monitoring and reviews are an opportunity for the OIPM to conduct a qualitative assessment of an investigation to ensure thoroughness, timeliness, fairness, transparency, accountability, and compliance with law, policy, and the Federal Consent Decree. The OIPM monitors and reviews the use of force, in-custody death, and critical incident investigations conducted by the Force Investigation Team (FIT) within the Public Integrity Bureau (PIB) of the NOPD. The OIPM is required by City Code § 2-1121 and by the MOU to monitor the quality and timeliness of NOPD's investigations into use of force and in-custody deaths. The OIPM will attend the investigation or the relevant activity, and will document the activity taken and not taken by the NOPD. The expectation is that the OIPM representative does not participate in the activity, but instead observes the police actions and takes notes.

While OIPM is notified of each use of force that occurs, OIPM gives the most attention to the most serious uses of force incidents, Critical Incidents. However, OIPM will often review lower-level uses of force incidents to ensure NOPD policy is being upheld.

Use of Force This Month 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025



0
Firearm Discharge this Month

0
Critical Incidents this Month

0
Level 4 Non-Critical Use of Force this Month


0
Additional Force Monitoring this Month

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

The community is vital to police oversight and the center of the work conducted by the OIPM. In the Memorandum of Understanding, the OIPM committed to developing relationships with community and civil groups to receive civilian and anonymous complaints, meeting with police associations, and conduct public outreach meetings and engagement activities. In this section of the Monthly Report, the OIPM explains the community outreach and public events that the OIPM coordinated or participated in the last month.

Outreach - December

2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025



5

Total Outreach Events this Month


Outreach Events

- IPM Stella Cziment Trained on Oversight/Monitoring @ NOPD Training Academy
- NOPD Municipal Training Academy Training Advisory Committee Meeting
- NOPD Training Video Approval Committee Meeting
- Memorial Inspection & Mass in Remembrance for Fallen First Responders
- 4th District PCAB Meeting, Dec. 16th



If you want to listen our Monitor's Mic programing, it is all available online. You can listen on the OIPM website:

<https://nolaipm.gov/the-monitors-mic/>



Stella and Kirschelle interview Chief Armstrong on the Monitor's Mic



ISB Sgt. Blackman at the Memorial Inspection and Mass.

COMMUNITY-POLICE MEDIATION

What is Mediation?

Mediation is an alternative to the traditional process of resolving complaints of police officer misconduct. Mediation provides a process facilitated by two professionally-trained community mediators to create mutual understanding and allow the officer and civilian to be fully heard and understood in a non-judgmental way. Mediation creates a safe, neutral space for officers and civilians to speak for themselves, share about their interaction and how it impacted them, explain what is important to them, and come to their own agreements and solutions about moving forward.

The Public Integrity Bureau (PIB) of the NOPD determines which complaints are referred to the Mediation Program. The types of complaints that are most often referred to mediation are those that allege lack of professionalism, neglect of duty, or discourtesy.

Complaints such as unauthorized use of force, unlawful search, and criminal allegations are ineligible for mediation and continue through the formal complaint investigation process by the PIB.

Voluntary


All participants engage in mediation at their own free will. They can end the process at any time and will not be forced to do anything or say anything they do not want to. No one is forced to agree to anything they do not want to.

Consent

All parties must voluntarily agree to participate in mediation and give consent. The consent process involves communication between the participant and the Mediation Director or program staff about the mediation process, what to expect, and clarification of any questions. Consent forms are signed in advance of confirming the mediation session.

Mediation Numbers - December

Mediations
Held
1



Cases Referred
6

Post-Investigation / Cleared by Camera (CBC) Mediation Numbers - December

Mediations
Scheduled for
January
1




Non-judgmental
Confidential
Voluntary



Mediation is:


- ➔ A participant-guided process that helps the community member and the officer come to a mutually-agreeable solution. This helps to create mutual understanding and improve relationships.
- ➔ A space of discussion without the need to say who is right or wrong. No evidence is needed. The mediators are not judges. The mediators do not present their thoughts on the issue.
- ➔ It's about dialog, not forced resolutions. People are not forced to shake hands or make-up. The role of the mediators is to be neutral 3rd party facilitators. They will not pressure either participant to come to an agreement.
- ➔ An opportunity for the community member and the officer to be in charge of their own process and outcome. It will not be decided by an outside agency or person. It is outside of any punishment framework or the legal process. There is no appeal because mediation is voluntary.

**Total Mediations Held This Month
2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025**



1
Total Mediations Held this month

**Total Mediations Held YTD In
2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025**



34
Total Mediations Held YTD

**Monthly Report of
Ethics Trainer**



DECEMBER 2025

MONTHLY REPORT

TRAINING DIVISION
NEW ORLEANS ETHICS REVIEW BOARD



2025 ETHICS EDUCATION & SEXUAL HARASSMENT PREVENTION TRAINING


The annual deadline for completion of the *2025 Ethics Education and Sexual Harassment Prevention Training* for City of New Orleans employees and the members of the Ethics Review Board was **Wednesday, December 31, 2025.**

All compliance records for both mandatory trainings have been submitted to the CAO's Employee Relations division, the custodian of those records.

The end-of-year numbers for the ERB Training Division are forthcoming.

Thank you to everyone for your compliance!

If you are a new user, you must register for access to the portal in order to continue. If you already have a login from previous years, it is still valid to access the system and you may continue through to complete your educational requirement under the tab labeled, "Ethics Training for Public Servants." A detailed walkthrough is available below, for your convenience.





DECEMBER HIGHLIGHTS

ETHICS LIAISON AND TORCH AWARDS PROGRAM

While we did not receive any nominations for possible Torch Award recipients, we are pleased to have a recipient of our Liaison Award.

Ethics Liaison Award

A recipient of the 2025 Ethics Liaison Award has been chosen! The 2025 Ethics Liaison Award will be bestowed upon:

Jasmine C. Henderson
Assistant HR Manager
City of New Orleans Department of Sanitation

Ms. Henderson has consistently ensured that her division achieves 100% compliance with mandatory ethics training. She stages her department's annual large training sessions and works with the ERB Trainer to facilitate small training sessions for employees who are otherwise unable to attend the department's main training session.

It is our pleasure to recognize Ms. Henderson for her dedication to ensuring that her division receives its annual education.



ASSOCIATION FOR TALENT DEVELOPMENT ANNUAL CONFERENCE 2026

After having attended the Association for Talent Development 2025 Annual Conference, the ERB trainer has an interest in attending the 2026 Annual Conference and will be speaking with the Board regarding sponsorship for attendance.

Details are forthcoming.



**Monthly Report of
Executive
Administrator**

MEMORANDUM

To: Ethics Review Board
City of New Orleans

From: Dane S. Ciolino
Executive Administrator and General
Counsel

Date: January 15, 2026

Re: *Monthly Report for December 2025*



I. COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS FOR ADVISORY OPINIONS

The ERB received one new complaint since the last board meeting, namely 2025-8. That complaint is on the agenda for the board's executive session.

II. APPOINTMENTS TO ERB

The Dillard ERB position remains unfilled (formerly Brooks).

Mayor Cantrell's appointee, Judge Michael Bagneris, resigned effective November 25, 2025. *See Bagneris Resignation Letter of November 25, 2025.*

Loyola's appointee, Dawn Broussard, recently announced her plans to resign effective January 21, 2026.

III. MAYORIAL AND COUNCIL APPOINTMENTS TO QUALITY ASSURANCE REVIEW ADVISORY COMMITTEES (QARACs)

Neither Mayor Cantrell nor the City Council has taken action to fill vacancies on the QARAC for the OIPM.

Note that on April 14, 2025, the ERB unanimously voted to appoint Sheridan Cooper of SUNO to serve as the ERB's appointee to the QARAC for the OIPM. Also on that day, the ERB unanimously voted to appoint Vanessa Rodriguez of SUNO to serve as the ERB's appointee to the QARAC for the OIG.

BAGNERIS, PIEKSEN & ASSOCIATES, LLC
935 Gravier Street, Suite 2110
New Orleans, LA 70112
Office (504) 493-7990 | Fax (504) 493-7991
bagneris@bpajustice.com | **pieksen@bpajustice.com**
colly@bpajustice.com

November 25, 2025

Dear Mayor,

Thank you for the opportunity to serve on the Ethics Board. Unfortunately, I am compelled to resign from it. Unlike other municipal boards, the Ethics Board has rules which adversely impacts me. For example, members of the Board cannot be publicly involved in political campaigns. For me, that's like keeping a fish out of water. This resignation is to take effect immediately.

Sincerely,



Michael G. Bagneris

cc: Dana Ciolino
Dawn Broussard
Patrice Sentino
Holly Callia
Sally Richardson
Monique Gougisha Doucette
Geraldine E. Robinson-Craig
All City Council members
Valerie Bouldin

Item 1

RE: Per your request

From Stella Cziment <scziment@nolaipm.gov>

Date Tue 18-Nov-25 2:13 PM

To Dane S. Ciolino <dane@daneciolino.com>

Good afternoon,

Thank you for this opportunity to reassess my salary (and for following up).

Currently, I need to respectfully decline the possibility of a salary adjustment due to the budget realities in the city of New Orleans. The budget of the OIPM would not support a salary adjustment and I will not cut into our services and programming budget.

I appreciate the ERB's interest in regular reassessments of salaries for the Independent Police Monitor position. Moving forward, I would support if this process was implemented on a regular interval to adjust my salary as the City's budget becomes more stable.

Thank you,

Edward Michel, CIIG

525 St. Charles Avenue, New Orleans, LA 70130 | Emichel@nola.ig.gov

Profile

Results-driven Inspector General offering more than 30 years of local and federal law enforcement expertise in the mitigation of fraud, waste, abuse, public corruption and civil rights violations. Accomplished Communications Program Manager versed in the successful utilization of social media to educate and protect the public from current and emerging threats.

Former FBI Hurricane Katrina Fraud Task Force Coordinator, Inspector-In-Place and Media Spokesperson with a proven record of accomplishment in leading United States Intelligence Special Agent's in the successful disruption and dismantlement of Transnational Organized Criminal and Terrorist Organizations.

Proven success in rehabilitating organizations under duress from poor leadership and restoring critical stakeholder collaboration resulting in improved office-wide transparency, mission critical success and inter-agency collaboration.

Areas of Expertise

- Developmental leader
- Mitigation of Civil Rights violations
- Mitigation of fraud, waste, and abuse
- Mitigation of public corruption
- Senior-level media spokesperson
- Budget origination / implementation
- Social media coordination
- Project planning / policy origination
- Tulane Professor / Risk Management and Threat Assessment
- Community collaboration with diverse populations
- Diversity and training program manager

Experience

INSPECTOR GENERAL | 11/2021 - Current

City of New Orleans - New Orleans, Louisiana

- Directed the efficient collection, analysis and dissemination of information to identify and mitigate fraud, waste, abuse and public corruption.
- Repaired strained stakeholder relationships while retaining effective employees.
- Directed and implemented the OIG Annual Work Plan to ensure compliance, reputational, organizational and financial risks were identified and mitigated in an efficient and effective manner.
- Oversaw an initiative which recovered \$1M of City funds that were transferred to a non - profit.
- Enhanced operational and administrative critical mission success of the OIG Audit, Investigations, Evaluations and IT Division's resulting in more than \$3.9M in potential savings to the City for 2022.
- Expanded partnerships with United States Law Enforcement Agencies which facilitated federal indictments of public employees who were using their public office for personal gain.
- Created and oversaw an initiative which identified more than 300 properties whose owners were facilitating Homestead Exemption Fraud which resulted in the reassessment of properties resulting in a recovery of substantial funds to the City.
- Initiated and implemented significant improvements to budget refinement, IT infrastructure and personnel augmentation which resulted in a 400 % increase in OIG report productivity.
- Developed and implemented an OIG website that clearly communicates the expertise and accomplishments of the Office of Inspector General.

- Enhanced OIG Social Media presence on several platforms to inform the public about fraud, waste and abuse.
- Recruited and hired several staff positions resulting in a 40% increase in OIG personnel.
- Selected and oversaw the actions of OIG General Counsel which successfully established OIG jurisdiction in the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals as well as successful employment court proceedings in New Orleans Civil Service Court and Louisiana Supreme Court as well as the United States District Court.

INTERIM INSPECTOR GENERAL | 11/2020 - Current

City of New Orleans - New Orleans, LA

- Restored OIG operational and administrative critical mission success during a chaotic transition.
- Repaired strained stakeholder relationships caused by disruptive and unproductive OIG employees.
- Regained trust and confidence of U.S. Federal Law Enforcement Agencies which facilitated federal indictments of government officials who were utilizing their public office for personal gain.
- Developed and implemented an operational budget ensuring limited resources were utilized in an efficient manner fostering transparency with the Ethics Review Board.
- Assessed, developed and implemented cyber intrusion testing procedures with the Department of Homeland Security. Applied necessary measures ensuring secure OIG bulk data acquisition, storage and transmission.
- Developed and implemented a communications plan to inform the Ethics Review Board, City Council and the public concerning the initiatives of the OIG.
- Implemented and coordinated a collaborative effort between OIG Audit, Evaluations, Investigations and Administrative Divisions which improved productivity and transparency.
- Restored confidence with the Quality Assurance Review Committee regarding the future operational tempo of the New Orleans Office of Inspector General.
- Established the New Orleans Office of Inspector General Citizens Academy enabling for significant engagement and collaboration with business, civic and religious leaders.

FIRST ASSISTANT OF INVESTIGATIONS & IT PM | 11/2019 - 11/2020

Office of Inspector General - New Orleans, LA

- Formulated and implemented a plan to investigate and mitigate allegations of misconduct by New Orleans Police Department executive personnel.
- Incorporated the use of social media to educate the public about fraud, waste, abuse and public corruption.
- Provided leadership, guidance and direction concerning investigative strategies to combat fraud, waste, abuse and public corruption.
- Assessed strengths and weaknesses of IT protocols and implemented strategies to ensure the successful accumulation, transmission and storage of sensitive bulk data.

ASSISTANT SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE | 07/2012 - 11/2019

Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI - Houston, TX

- Mitigated significant threats to the Homeland as the FBI executive leader of the financial institutional fraud, criminal, counterterrorism and counterintelligence programs.
- Formulated, approved and implemented tactics and strategies concerning criminal and administrative operations of the FBI Houston Field Office, to include Corpus Christi, Bryan College, Texas City and Beaumont satellite offices.
- FBI Inspector-In-Place ensuring compliance with financial management protocols. Led investigations of employee misconduct to include Equal Employment Opportunity Act and Office of Professional Responsibility violations.
- Directed FBI Houston Community Outreach and Media Programs to build a broad based coalition in a diverse cultural environment.
- Recommended and established program and personnel resource allocations, in accordance with DOJ Threat Review Prioritization principles.
- Conducted threat assessments concerning Critical Infrastructure integrity to include port and border vulnerabilities.

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR | 12/2010 - 07/2012

FBI Headquarters - Washington, DC

- Standardized and implemented improved metrics data to enable the FBI Assistant Director to communicate the successes of a 2000 member entity with a significant operating budget to the U.S. Congress, House Oversight

Committee and the General Accounting Office.

- Significantly improved operational coordination of FBI Intelligence Analysts and Information Technology personnel resulting in enhanced electronic tracking and mitigation of terrorists.
- Developed scorecard proficiencies to determine correlation between expenditure of resources and successful disruptions of risks.
- Coordinated joint duty operations between multiple agencies of the United States Intelligence Community and International Law Enforcement Agencies to identify and mitigate threats to the Homeland and abroad.
- Prepared and submitted annual budgets for review by the U.S. Congress and Government Accountability Office.

SENIOR SUPERVISORY RESIDENT AGENT IN CHARGE | 10/2007 - 12/2010

FBI - Baton Rouge, LA

- Repaired strained relationship with the United States Attorney which resulted in expedited grand jury indictments and prosecutions.
- Identified risks through sophisticated investigative techniques which mitigated systemic public corruption resulting in the convictions of police officers and senior city prosecutors who were using their public office for personal gain.
- Established FBI Baton Rouge as the primary law enforcement leader in the area and was awarded the Integrity Award for my relentless pursuit of fraud, waste and abuse by the Office of Inspector General, H.H.S.
- Created and led the Baton Rouge Public Corruption Task Force which mitigated systemic corruption within the Baton Rouge Capitol.
- Directed organized and violent crime investigations, to include kidnappings, bank robbery, major theft, fugitive, and child abduction matters.
- Led the FBI Baton Rouge Resident Agency to include Special Agents, Task Force Officers and Intelligence Analysts in the mitigation of police corruption and health care fraud.
- Established the Financial Institution Fraud Task Force and Health Care Strike Force ensuring mitigation of insider threats.

SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT | 11/2005 - 10/2007

FBI - Washington, DC

- Developed a minimal internal control system to protect the integrity of Indian Gaming, a \$26 billion dollar a year industry which exceeded the combined revenues of Atlantic City and Las Vegas casinos.
- Developed, and implemented a national training agenda for 430 Indian Casinos to mitigate the most prevalent threats facing Indian Gaming to include public corruption, fraud, and forensic analysis as well as organized crime.
- Recruited and led several United States Intelligence Community members by combining the resources of more than 20 agencies to safeguard Indian Nation Resources. Successfully implemented Indian Gaming Regulatory Act requirements established by the U.S. Congress.
- Mitigated Crimes on the High Seas by securing U.S. interest in collaboration with U.S. allies abroad.
- Developed and implemented an operational regulatory unit to conduct audits to comply with U.S. Congressional requirements of the Child Protection and Obscenity Act to prevent the exploitation of children.

SPECIAL AGENT | 12/1996 - 11/2005

FBI - Mobile, AL

- Developed and led a coalition of multiple federal and local law enforcement agencies in the mitigation of threats posed by corrupt public officials and narcotic traffickers.
- Primary case agent on complex public corruption undercover investigations, which successfully mitigated corrupt law enforcement officers.
- Conducted investigations resulting in successful prosecutions of federal criminal violations to include financial institution fraud, public corruption and civil rights.
- Served as the FBI Mobile Media Spokesperson and Evidence Response Team Leader ensuring sensitive information was processed and shared with the public to locate suspects under indictment.
- Primary case agent targeting police officers and D.E.A. Task Force Officers who illegally seized and redistributed narcotics.
- Initiated the empanelment of a Special Federal Grand Jury which indicted seven police officers and a D.E.A. Task Force Officer who were convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

POLICE OFFICER | 05/1992 - 12/1996

New Orleans Police Department - New Orleans, LA

- Assigned to Superintendent of Police as a New Orleans Police Spokesperson.
- Apprehended suspects, prepared case reports and testified in courtroom hearings.
- Mitigated domestic-related disturbances and protected victims from harm.
- Field Training Officer responsible for creating and implementing developmental plans for police recruits in the areas of automobile accident investigations, criminal investigations and crime scene management.
- Developed initiatives focusing on Crime Prevention and Community Outreach programs.

Education

Tulane University - New Orleans, LA | Master of Arts

Masters of Professional Studies , 12/2017

Tulane University - New Orleans, LA | Bachelor of Arts

Paralegal Studies, 05/1992

Published Articles

Diversity of Computer Systems to Mitigate Risks

Warning Policymakers of Military Surprise Attacks

Denial and Deception Practices Utilized by Foreign Intelligence Agencies : Impact on US Policymakers

Analytic Pitfalls in the Special Intelligence Estimate on Soviet Military Assistance to Cuba

United States Intelligence Community Evolution and the Creation of the All-Source Analysis

Municipal Inspectors General Salary Survey (Full Report)

1. Methodology

This report surveys publicly available salary data for municipal Inspectors General (IGs) across major U.S. cities. It includes: - Verified incumbent salaries from public payroll databases and municipal documents. - Salary ranges from current or recent IG and Deputy IG job postings. - Two averages: (1) incumbents only; (2) incumbents + job-posting midpoints.

Scope focused on large U.S. cities with established IG offices: New Orleans, Atlanta, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Seattle, Dallas, New York City, Los Angeles, and others where data were reliably available.

2. Incumbent Municipal Inspector General Salaries

Verified Salaries of Current or Recent IGs

City	Position	Salary	Source
New Orleans, LA	Inspector General	\$294,780	WDSU city payroll reporting
Atlanta, GA	Inspector General	\$213,733	GovSalaries
Chicago, IL	Inspector General	\$189,360	OpenPayrolls
Detroit, MI	Inspector General	\$186,001	GovSalaries
Philadelphia, PA	Inspector General	\$190,985	GovSalaries
Baltimore, MD	Inspector General (Executive Director II)	\$187,473	OpenPayrolls
Seattle, WA	Inspector General for Public Safety	\$174,000 (starting)	Local reporting
Dallas, TX	Inspector General	\$150,000	KERA/WFAA
New York City, NY	Inspector General (agency-level)	\$151,858	OpenPayrolls
New York City, NY	Inspector General (agency-level)	\$151,858	OpenPayrolls

Average (Incumbents Only)

Total salaries (10 data points): **\$1,890,048**

Average: **\$189,005**

3. Job Postings for IG and Deputy IG Roles

Salary ranges from postings were included and midpoints calculated for the combined dataset average.

City	Position	Salary Range	Midpoint
Los Angeles, CA	Inspector General (Police Commission)	\$169,169 – \$247,323	\$208,246
Detroit, MI	Inspector General	\$154,877 – \$222,939	\$188,908
New York City, NY	Inspector General – OIG NYPD	\$103,355 – \$220,796	\$162,076
Chicago, IL	Deputy Inspector General – Public Safety	\$136,968 – \$151,320	\$144,144

These are not incumbents but reflect market hiring expectations.

4. Combined Dataset Average

14 total entries (10 incumbents + 4 posting midpoints).

Combined total \approx **\$2,593,421.50**.

Combined average: \$185,244.

5. Interpretive Notes

Big-city compensation pattern

- The typical range for large-municipality IGs: **\$175,000–\$225,000**.
- New Orleans is the highest in this dataset (~\$295k).
- Most cities (Atlanta, Philadelphia, Chicago, Detroit, Baltimore) cluster around **\$185k–\$210k**.
- NYC has multiple IGs assigned to departments; agency IG salaries (~\$152k) reflect narrower scope.

Structural differences

- Cities vary widely: some have one citywide IG (New Orleans, Detroit), others have specialized IGs (NYC DOI model), and some have public-safety-only IGs (Seattle, LA Police Commission IG).

Data-quality considerations

- Payroll databases (OpenPayrolls, GovSalaries) use official data but occasionally lag or misclassify titles.
- Job postings reflect salary policy, not negotiated salaries.

Excluded dataset

- Salary.com's "City of Houston Inspector General" listing at ~\$48k is clearly not an oversight IG and was excluded.

6. Key Conclusions

- **Incumbents-only average: \$189,005.**
- **Combined average with postings: \$185,244.**
- Realistic benchmark for a city with independent IG authority: **\$175k-\$225k.**
- New Orleans' IG compensation is materially above peer norms.

7. Checklist for Verification

1. Verify each city's payroll entry through its cited public source.
2. Confirm the year of the payroll data (prefer 2023-2024).
3. Check postings for accurate min/max salary ranges.
4. Decide whether NYC agency IG salaries should be averaged or treated individually.
5. Exclude non-head positions and state/federal IG roles.
6. Note structural differences in IG roles when comparing cities.

COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF MUNICIPAL INSPECTOR GENERAL SALARIES

Across Major United States Urban Centers

Report Date: December 3, 2025

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents a comprehensive analysis of Inspector General salaries serving municipalities throughout the United States, with a focus on major urban centers. Based on publicly available salary data, job postings, and official municipal documents, the research reveals that:

- Average Municipal Inspector General Salary: **\$200,835** • Salary Range: \$150,000 to \$255,000 for leadership positions
 - Cities Surveyed: 13+ major municipalities • Data Sources: Public records, job postings, municipal budgets, and salary databases
-

METHODOLOGY

This survey examined publicly available salary information for municipal Inspectors General across major U.S. cities with populations exceeding 500,000. Data sources included official municipal salary databases, job postings, news reports of salary adjustments, and public budget documents. The survey focused on leadership Inspector General positions rather than staff-level positions within IG offices.

DETAILED FINDINGS BY MUNICIPALITY

1. New Orleans, LA

- Current Salary: \$255,000 (raised from \$215,000 in 2024)
- Source: [1]

2. Detroit, MI

- Salary Range: \$154,877 - \$222,939
- Midpoint: \$188,908
- Source: [2]

3. Dallas, TX

- Salary: \$200,000+
- Job posting starting salary; budgeted at \$197,558
- Interim IG: \$150,000
- Source: [3]

4. San Francisco, CA

- Salary Range: \$167,336 - \$213,512
- Midpoint: \$190,424
- Controller's Bureau of Audits
- Source: [4]

5. Baltimore County, MD

- Current IG: \$169,843
- Proposed replacement: \$218,000
- Posted range: \$147,000 - \$188,000
- Source: [5]

6. Philadelphia, PA

- Deputy Inspector General: \$114,068 - \$120,000
- Staff position data available
- Source: [6]

7. Chicago, IL

- Chief Inspector: ~\$156,035
- Operations Analyst: ~\$63,723
- General staff averages: \$86,167
- Source: [7]

8. Los Angeles County, CA

- Multiple IG positions and offices
- Varies by position
- Source: [8]

9. Miami-Dade County, FL

- Office budget data available
- Specific IG salary not publicly listed
- Source: [9]

SALARY ANALYSIS BY CITY SIZE

Major Cities (Population 1M+)

Inspector General salaries in the largest U.S. cities typically range from **\$150,000 to \$255,000**, with an average around \$200,000. Cities like New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago maintain multiple oversight positions with varying salary structures.

Large Cities (Population 500K-1M)

Mid-tier major cities offer Inspector General salaries ranging from **\$150,000 to \$220,000**, competitive with larger municipalities due to the critical nature of oversight functions.

Geographic Salary Variations

Significant regional differences exist in Inspector General compensation [10]:

• California: Average \$310,444 • District of Columbia: Average \$311,626 • Massachusetts: Average \$306,306 • Louisiana: Average \$267,606

These averages include state and federal positions but demonstrate regional cost-of-living impacts on municipal salaries.

KEY FINDINGS AND TRENDS

1. Salary Increases

Several municipalities have recently increased Inspector General salaries to attract and retain qualified candidates. New Orleans notably raised its IG salary from \$215,000 to \$255,000 in 2024 [1], reflecting a trend toward higher compensation for these critical oversight positions.

2. Competitive Market

Job postings reveal municipalities are competing for experienced candidates, with starting salaries frequently advertised at \$200,000 or above for major cities. Dallas, for example, advertised a starting salary exceeding \$200,000 [3].

3. Staff vs. Leadership Positions

While this survey focuses on leadership Inspector General positions, staff positions within IG offices (investigators, auditors, analysts) typically earn between \$50,000 and \$120,000 annually, creating a clear career progression structure.

4. Budget Constraints and Variations

Smaller municipalities may struggle to offer competitive salaries, with some positions remaining vacant due to budget limitations. This can affect the quality and independence of municipal oversight.

CALCULATED AVERAGE

Municipal Inspector General Salary Average

Based on confirmed salary data from five major municipalities with clear leadership IG compensation:

• New Orleans: \$255,000 • Dallas: \$200,000 • San Francisco (midpoint): \$190,424 • Detroit (midpoint): \$188,908 • Baltimore County: \$169,843

CALCULATED AVERAGE: \$200,835

MUNICIPALITIES SURVEYED

This comprehensive survey examined Inspector General offices and salary data from the following municipalities:

• New Orleans, Louisiana • Chicago, Illinois • New York, New York • Los Angeles, California (County) • Detroit,

CONCLUSION

Municipal Inspector General positions command substantial salaries commensurate with their responsibilities for oversight, investigation, and accountability. The average salary of approximately **\$200,835** reflects the critical importance of these positions in municipal governance. Salaries vary significantly based on city size, geographic location, and cost of living, with major coastal cities typically offering the highest compensation.

Recent trends indicate municipalities are increasing salaries to attract qualified candidates with backgrounds in law, auditing, investigation, and public administration. As cities recognize the value of strong oversight mechanisms, competitive compensation for Inspectors General is likely to continue rising.

REFERENCES AND FOOTNOTES

- [1] New Orleans Inspector General salary data: Based on reports of Ed Michel's salary increase from \$215,000 to \$255,000 in 2024. Sources include New Orleans city council records and local news coverage of the salary adjustment.
- [2] Detroit Inspector General salary range: Detroit city government salary schedules and job postings listing the Inspector General position at \$154,877 to \$222,939 annually.
- [3] Dallas Inspector General salary: Dallas city job postings and budget documents indicating starting salary of \$200,000+ for the Inspector General position, with city council budgeting \$197,558 for the role. Interim IG compensation reported at \$150,000.
- [4] San Francisco Inspector General salary range: San Francisco Controller's Office salary data and city employee compensation records showing the range of \$167,336 to \$213,512 for Inspector General positions within the Bureau of Audits.
- [5] Baltimore County Inspector General salary: Baltimore County public salary records showing current IG compensation at \$169,843, with proposed replacement position budgeted at \$218,000. Job postings also listed ranges of \$147,000 to \$188,000.
- [6] Philadelphia Inspector General office salaries: Philadelphia city salary databases showing Deputy Inspector General positions at \$114,068 to \$120,000, with staff positions varying within the IG office.
- [7] Chicago Inspector General office salaries: Chicago city employee salary data showing Chief Inspector position at approximately \$156,035, with other staff positions including Operations Analysts at around \$63,723 and general office staff averaging \$86,167.
- [8] Los Angeles County Inspector General: Los Angeles County maintains multiple Inspector General positions across various departments. Specific salary data varies by position and department oversight responsibilities.
- [9] Miami-Dade County Inspector General: Miami-Dade County Office of Inspector General maintains public budget information, though specific IG salary figures were not clearly listed in readily accessible public documents at the time of research.
- [10] Geographic salary variations: State-level average salary data for Inspector General positions compiled from multiple sources including Salary.com, ZipRecruiter, and government salary databases. These averages include state and federal positions and demonstrate regional compensation trends that influence municipal salaries.

Additional Sources: Data compiled from municipal salary databases, Transparent California, city budget documents, job posting sites (Indeed, Governmentjobs.com), local news reports of salary adjustments, and public records requests responses available online. Research conducted December 2025.

Item 2

IPM - Timeline of Significant Events

December 2002

- [Report of the Police-Civilian Review Task Force](#)

January 18, 2007

- Based on the 2002 Police-Civilian Review Task Force report recommendation, the City Council retained the Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC) “to provide the Council and Administration with expert guidance regarding the establishment of the Office of the Independent Monitor”¹

July 10, 2008

- City Council adopted an amendment to Chapter 2, Article XIII of the Code by adding a new section establishing an Independent Police Monitoring Division within the Office of Inspector General.²

CITY CHARTER AMENDMENT — OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUMMARY: A PROPOSITION TO AMEND SECTION 9-401 OF THE HOME RULE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS RELATIVE TO THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL (OIG) TO REQUIRE THAT THE COUNCIL ESTABLISH THE OIG BY ORDINANCE; TO PROVIDE FOR THE INVESTIGATIVE, AUDIT AND OTHER FUNCTIONS OF THE OIG INCLUDING AN INDEPENDENT POLICE MONITOR; TO PROVIDE FOR GUARANTEED ANNUAL FUNDING FOR THE OIG AND ETHICS REVIEW BOARD; AND TO PROVIDE THAT THE OIG MAY RETAIN SPECIAL COUNSEL.

Shall Section 9-401 of the Home Rule Charter of the City of New Orleans be amended to read as follows?

“Section 9-401. Office of Inspector General.

(1) The Council shall by ordinance create an Office of Inspector General (OIG) and otherwise provide with respect thereto.

(2) The OIG shall provide for a full-time program of investigation, audit, inspections, and performance review to provide increased accountability and oversight of entities of city government or entities receiving funds through the city, and to assist in improving agency operations and deterring and identifying, fraud, waste, abuse, and illegal acts. The OIG is specifically authorized to conduct audits of City entities. The OIG shall also provide for an Independent Police Monitor Division, charged with monitoring the operations of the New Orleans Police Department, particularly in the areas of civilian and internally-generated complaints, internal investigations, discipline, significant uses of force, and in custody deaths.

(3) The OIG, in conjunction with the Ethics Review Board, shall receive an annual appropriation from the Council in an amount not less than .75% (three-quarters of one percent) of the General Fund operating budget, adopted pursuant to Section 3-115(2), which

¹ Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Council of the City of New Orleans, January 18, 2007.

² [City of New Orleans 2008 Ordinance Nos. 22946-23364, p. 442.](#)

individual appropriation may not be vetoed by the Mayor, notwithstanding the Mayor's authority pursuant to Section 3-113(4) to disapprove or reduce any item or items of appropriation, and also notwithstanding the Mayor's authority pursuant to Section 3-113(2) to disapprove any ordinance in its entirety. The Council may by ordinance, adopted by unanimous vote of a quorum, provide for deviation from this percentage in cases of natural disaster or other extreme circumstances. Of the budget percentage specified in this paragraph, an amount shall be allocated for the operation of the Ethics Review Board adequate to implement its functions efficiently and effectively.

(4) The OIG may retain special counsel notwithstanding the provisions of Section 403 of this Charter."

The amendment proposed herein shall become effective immediately upon completion of the filing of authenticated copies required by Section 9-203 of the Home Rule Charter.

(b) That the language used in the official ballot shall include all that is required by law and may be subjected to any modifications, additions and deletions deemed necessary in the opinion of the City Attorney to enable the ballot proposition to conform to all requirements of law.

September 24, 2015

- Inspector General Ed Quatrevaux submitted request to ERB calling for the immediate termination of the Independent Police Monitor, Susan Hutson.³

October 15, 2015

- City Council adopted [Substitute Resolution R-15-507](#).⁴

Brief:

Requesting the Office of Inspector General ("OIG") and the Independent Police Monitor ("IPM") to comply with the following agreement...

- [CAL. NO. 30,937](#) introduced at Regular City Council Meeting

Brief:

An Ordinance to amend and reordain Section 2-1121 of the Code of the City of New Orleans to establish the authority, duties, functions and powers of the Office of Independent Police Monitor, to establish the process for selection of the Independent Police Monitor and the qualifications for appointment, to provide for access to all complaints of police misconduct to the Independent Police Monitor, to provide for the investigatory authority of the Independent Police Monitor, to provide for access of the Independent Police Monitor to all critical incidents and investigatory materials into misconduct, to provide for funding of the Independent Police Monitor, to clarify the relationship of the Independent Police Monitor with the Office of the Inspector General; and otherwise to provide with respect thereto.

November 19, 2015

- City Council passed ordinance CAL. NO. 31,019

Brief:

An Ordinance calling an election for April 9, 2016, at which shall be submitted to the electors of the City of New Orleans a certain proposal to amend Article IX, Chapter 4 of the Home Rule Charter of the City of New Orleans by amending Sections 9-401 and 9-402 and enacting new Sections 9-403 and 9-404, all in order to provide for the proper apportionment of dedicated funding among the Office of Inspector General, Office of Independent Police Monitor, and Ethics Review Board; to provide for operational and financial independence of the Office of Independent Police Monitor; to establish independent external evaluation procedures for the Office of Inspector General, Office of Independent Police Monitor, and Ethics Review Board; and otherwise to provide with respect thereto.

This proposed amendment did not appear on the April 9, 2016 ballot, but appears to have been on the November 8, 2016 ballot

³ [Substitute Resolution No. R15-507 by Councilmembers Cantrell and Brossett, October 15, 2015.](#)

⁴ [Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Council of the City of New Orleans, October 15, 2015.](#)

- [Bureau of Governmental Research Report](#)
[Bureau of Governmental Research “In Brief”](#)
[Bureau of Governmental Research “Media Release”](#)

May 5, 2016

- CAL. NO. 30,937 withdrawn at Regular City Council Meeting.⁵

November 8, 2016

- Amendment to the Home Rule Charter was approved by voters.

March 9, 2017

- City Council passed ordinance [CAL. NO. 31,705](#) ([Amendments to Ordinance CAL. NO. 31,705](#))⁶
Brief:
An Ordinance to ordain Article XIV of Chapter 2, and amend and reordain Section 2-1121 therein, of the Code of the City of New Orleans to establish a separate Article relative to the Office of the Independent Police Monitor (OIPM), to provide that said Office is independent from the Office of Inspector General, pursuant to Home Rule Charter Section 9-403, OIPM appointment procedures, term of office, removal procedures, evaluation requirements; and to provide otherwise with respect thereto.
- City Council passed ordinance [CAL. NO. 31,706](#)⁷
Brief:
An Ordinance to amend and reordain Section 2-1120 of the Code of the City of New Orleans, to remove all references and oversight authority relative to the Office of the Independent Police Monitor from the Office of the Inspector General, pursuant to the Home Rule Charter amendment; and to provide otherwise with respect thereto.

NOTE: Until this point, the Independent Police Monitor, as “an officer or employee of the inspector general,” was held to the “restrictions on appointment listed in Chapter 2, Article XII, Section 2-1120 (3)(d):

An officer or employee of the office of the inspector general shall not hold, or be a candidate for, any elective office while an officer or employee, or for four years thereafter. An officer or employee of the office of the inspector general shall not hold office in any political party or political committee, or participate in any political campaign of any candidate for public office, or make any campaign contribution or campaign endorsement, while an officer or employee of the office of inspector general.

⁵ [Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Council of the City of New Orleans, May 5, 2016.](#)

⁶ [Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Council of the City of New Orleans, March 9, 2017.](#)

⁷ Ibid.



ON THE BALLOT

A Report from the Bureau
of Governmental Research

NEW ORLEANS POLICE MONITOR CHARTER AMENDMENT, NOVEMBER 8, 2016

INTRODUCTION

On November 8, voters in Orleans Parish will decide on a proposed home rule charter amendment to change the structural relationships and funding among three ethics entities: the Ethics Review Board, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the Office of Independent Police Monitor (Police Monitor Division).¹

WHAT IT WOULD DO

The charter currently requires the City Council to create an Office of Inspector General and establish an Ethics Review Board.² The charter also requires the OIG to provide for an Independent Police Monitor Division.³ The charter dedicates at least 0.75% of the City's annual General Fund budget to the OIG and the Ethics Review Board, with funding for the Police Monitor Division included in the OIG's allocation.⁴

The proposed charter amendment would change existing provisions to:

- Remove the language placing the Police Monitor Division within the OIG and require the City Council to pass an ordinance creating an Office of Independent Police Monitor "and otherwise provide with respect thereto."
- Expand the charter definition of the Police Monitor's scope of work.⁵
- Authorize the Police Monitor to independently hire or contract for legal services.
- Require distribution of the 0.75% General Fund appropriation as follows: 0.55% to the OIG, 0.16% to the Police Monitor and 0.04% to the Ethics Review Board.
- Require the City Council to pass an ordinance that

establishes external evaluation procedures for the three ethics entities.

BACKGROUND

In 1995, voters approved charter amendments allowing the City Council to create an Office of Inspector General and requiring the Council to establish an Ethics Review Board. However, the City provided no funding and neither entity got off the ground. A decade later the mayor revived the Ethics Review Board and the City Council passed an ordinance establishing an OIG.

The Ethics Review Board appointed the City's first inspector general in 2007. The following year, the City Council passed an ordinance requiring the OIG to establish an "independent police monitoring division" and appoint an independent police monitor.⁶ Later that year, voters approved a charter amendment that outlined the duties and powers of the OIG, made the Police Monitor Division a permanent part of the Inspector General's office, and dedicated 0.75% of the General Fund to the office.

BGR supported the amendment in its October 2008 *On the Ballot* report, noting that it was important to protect the OIG from funding cuts. But BGR raised concerns about the permanent dedication of significant revenues, noting that a fixed percentage could lead to outsized budgets and a lack of accountability.⁷

That amendment instructed the OIG to provide for a Police Monitor's office as a "division" of the OIG.⁸ The City Council ordinance accompanying the amendment provided essential details for implementation.⁹

The companion ordinance, which remains in place, addresses the many issues relevant to the creation of the Police Monitor Division, including, for example, staffing, qualifications, responsibilities, and investigatory powers.¹⁰

Importantly, the ordinance calls on the Inspector General to choose the Police Monitor from among three finalists pre-

sented by a search committee.¹¹ The ordinance does not, however, allow the Inspector General to remove the Police Monitor. While he may recommend removal, it must be approved by a majority of the Ethics Review Board.¹²

The Inspector General hired the City's first Police Monitor in 2010. In 2015, the Inspector General called for her removal, citing a litany of alleged offenses.¹³ The Police Monitor defended herself against allegations of misconduct.¹⁴ She also argued that her office needed independence and separate funding in order to operate effectively.¹⁵

The Ethics Review Board never held a vote on the recommended termination. Thereafter, with the assistance of the City Council, the OIG and Police Monitor contractually agreed to a redefined operational framework.¹⁶

Under the agreement, the Police Monitor Division achieved physical, financial and operational separation from the OIG. The OIG transferred \$92,500 in excess funds from the Ethics Review Board budget to the Police Monitor Division to assist with its relocation. The OIG also agreed to provide the Police Monitor Division with 0.16% of the total dedicated funding received by the ethics entities in 2016, or nearly \$1 million. And, upon execution of the agreement, the Inspector General rescinded his recommendation to terminate the Police Monitor.¹⁷

The charter proposition seeks to make the current separation between the OIG and Police Monitor permanent and create a separate, dedicated funding source for the Police Monitor.

If voters reject the proposition, the current agreement requires the OIG and Police Monitor Division to negotiate a memorandum of understanding that will honor the division's "operational independence, independent work product and funding structure" as outlined in the original agreement.¹⁸

ANALYSIS

The following discussion analyzes the proposed charter amendment in terms of: the necessity of the amendment; whether voters have sufficient information; whether the tax

dedication makes sense; and whether the amendment is the appropriate way to address the problem.

Is the Charter Amendment Necessary?

Proponents say the charter amendment is necessary to resolve the conflict between the OIG and Police Monitor. They reason that a permanent separation resolves the problem once and for all, stabilizes the Police Monitor's office, and eliminates a time-consuming distraction for two offices that perform important functions.

In addition, the Inspector General and Police Monitor say the amendment is necessary to fix a flawed structural relationship between the OIG and Police Monitor Division. The current charter creates two independent oversight entities – the OIG and Police Monitor – with different missions, responsibilities and activities, but requires one to operate under the supervision of the other. The Inspector General and Police Monitor say this structural relationship is unworkable.

The Police Monitor also says the amendment is necessary to allow the division to receive citizen and officer complaints. Previously, the Police Monitor shared office space with the OIG in a highly secure federal building located downtown. According to the Police Monitor, the building location was not easily accessible to the public and its security measures intimidated complainants.

Finally, the Police Monitor Division says that the office is meant to be independent, and that it cannot be truly independent under the OIG. Indeed, some form of independence is implied in the full title "Independent Police Monitor." However, other observers argue that the word "independent" refers to the Police Monitor's independence from the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD), rather than independence from all government oversight. BGR's research on the structure of other police oversight entities, discussed below, supports the latter interpretation.

Voters should be aware that there are potential alternative paths to resolving the conflict between the two parties that do not require a charter amendment. These include:

“Voters should be aware that there are potential alternative paths to resolving the conflict between the two parties that do not require a charter amendment.”

- Maintaining the status quo. The agreement between the OIG and the Police Monitor Division requires that, should voters reject the charter change, the Police Monitor Division and the OIG will negotiate a new agreement that will honor the division's current "operational independence, independent work product and funding structure."¹⁹ And the Police Monitor has already moved to an office location that meets its needs.
- Seeking a court interpretation of the pertinent charter provisions and ordinances concerning office structure and hierarchy, and then requiring the parties to abide by that determination.
- Amending the existing ordinance to align the authority to hire and terminate the Police Monitor with one entity, whether within the OIG or the Ethics Review Board.
- Resolving the conflict as a personnel matter through the Ethics Review Board.

In short, a charter change may not be necessary to solve the conflict between the Police Monitor Division and the OIG.

As discussed in detail below, BGR looked at police oversight offices nationwide and found no clear template for structuring such an office. It also found no evidence that police oversight offices elsewhere have greater independence from political interference; indeed, the opposite may be the case in some other cities. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the conflict is due to any inherent flaw in the charter provisions making the Police Monitor a division of the OIG. Nor is the arrangement unique.²⁰

By the same token, it is not obvious that the Police Monitor Division is best situated within the OIG. As discussed below, the predominant approach among the other cities BGR examined is to have the police monitor division serve under the mayor (or city manager), with varying degrees of city council involvement.

A re-evaluation of the current structure would ideally explore best practices and weigh the pros and cons of various alternatives as part of a comprehensive analysis. BGR found no evidence that such an analysis has been conducted. However, in June 2013, the OIG produced an internal analysis calling for greater OIG authority over the Police Monitor Division and greater integration of the Police Monitor Division within the OIG – the opposite of what is now being contemplated.²¹

What Will the New Arrangement Look Like?

When voters approved the charter change establishing the Police Monitor Division, they had the benefit of a companion ordinance specifying the powers and responsibilities of the Police Monitor.²² For the current amendment, however, the City Council had not presented any companion ordinance at the time BGR prepared this report. Without a companion ordinance, the charter amendment presents an incomplete picture of the revised Police Monitor structure that would emerge upon passage of the amendment.

On the other hand, even if the Council presents or adopts a companion ordinance in the weeks before the election,²³ it can amend the ordinance at any time following the election. It should also be noted that the current ordinance, placing the Police Monitor within the OIG and requiring that the OIG hire the Police Monitor, would remain in place unless a new ordinance were passed.

Nonetheless, without a companion ordinance before election day, voters will be in the dark regarding key questions, including:

- Who will hire, review and, if necessary, terminate the Police Monitor? Proponents suggest that the Ethics Review Board would do so, but the charter amendment does not require that; further, there is nothing in the board's composition or experience that suggests it would be better positioned to oversee the Police Monitor than is the OIG. Moreover, under the proposed amendment, the City Council could designate itself, the mayor or even the NOPD as the hiring entity, thereby diminishing the Police Monitor's current level of independence. In fact, under the proposed language, the City Council could place the Police Monitor back under the OIG.
- The proposed charter amendment calls for external evaluation of the OIG, the Police Monitor and the Ethics Review Board. What will the evaluation process look like? The OIG, for instance, is required to undergo a peer review every three years²⁴ and an annual quality assurance review conducted by a three-member citizen committee.²⁵ The Police Monitor, as a division of the OIG, has been included in past quality assurance reviews. Proponents, including the Police Monitor, support establishing a periodic peer review by a peer civilian law enforcement oversight organization.

- Will the Police Monitor be subject to set terms of service? For instance, the Ethics Review Board appoints the OIG to a four-year term, after which he can be reappointed.²⁶
- What powers or authority will the Police Monitor have? Will the office have subpoena power, for instance? Will it be able to shield its records from public review?

BGR researched 17 police oversight offices nationwide and found that there is wide variation among them.²⁷ In 16 of the jurisdictions, the appointing authority – which hires and fires the police monitor – is a top city official (typically the mayor), the city council, or a combination of both.²⁸ In Washington, D.C., the head of the police oversight agency is hired by an appointed board.²⁹

Among the 17 police oversight offices, 11 have no set terms of office. Four jurisdictions impose three or four-year terms, while two jurisdictions require a periodic contract renewal process.³⁰

In 15 of the jurisdictions, police monitors and support personnel are hired as government employees. The two others hire the police monitor and staff as independent contractors.³¹

In 13 jurisdictions, a citizen-appointed board provides an additional layer of oversight for law enforcement.³² These citizen boards play varying roles in shaping police department policies and protocols. Four of the 13 boards review the effectiveness of the police monitor.³³

Finally, a police monitor's powers also vary widely by jurisdiction. In about half of the jurisdictions, police monitors are authorized to conduct independent investigations concerning police complaints and may also actively monitor critical incidents, such as officer-involved shootings or in-custody deaths. Five police monitors even have the power to subpoena testimony and documents for investigative purposes.³⁴

In the other jurisdictions, a police monitor's authority is more limited. Investigative authority may extend only to those investigations that have already been conducted and completed by the police department. Police monitor offices with limited investigative authority generally focus on reviewing existing protocols and providing policy recommendations for improvement.

In short, based on BGR's survey work, the reconfigured Police Monitor's office could take on a wide variety of structures and responsibilities. Moreover, the Police Monitor has characterized the division's current structure as a "unique hybrid" that is "difficult to compare to others." Given all of the unknowns, it is hard to gauge the potential success and effectiveness of the new structure without a companion ordinance.

Does the Tax Dedication Make Sense?

The proposition asks voters to permanently redistribute the General Fund appropriation among the ethics entities. For the Police Monitor, this means a 0.16% dedication in perpetuity. This amounts to nearly \$1 million in 2016,³⁵ but the figure will grow with time as the General Fund grows.

Proponents see the amendment as a further division of funding that is essential to the Police Monitor's ability to budget for and grow its staff and effectively execute the office's mission.

As noted above, BGR supported the dedication of funds to the OIG through the 2008 charter amendment, but it did so with reservations. At the time, BGR noted that some form of dedicated funding was necessary to establish and maintain the OIG's independence. This is important because otherwise the OIG's funding would be subject to the discretion of the Mayor and the City Council, which fall within the investigatory jurisdiction of the OIG. Without independent funding, the OIG would be less likely to investigate these elected officials or their political allies. Similarly, the Ethics Review Board's jurisdiction includes all elected and appointed officials, making some form of dedicated funding necessary.³⁶ Because the Police Monitor's jurisdiction is limited to the NOPD, this concern does not translate and the case for dedicated funding is less compelling.

Indeed, BGR'S survey work found no other police oversight office that receives dedicated funding. Rather, the offices that responded to BGR's survey participate in the budget process like other departments and agencies.

Dedicated funding already exists as a pot of money to be shared among the OIG, the Police Monitor and the Ethics Review Board. However, some proponents of the charter change argue that the charter creates an inherent conflict, claiming that funding for the Ethics Review Board must be approved by its subordinate, the OIG, and that the Ethics

“The Police Monitor has an important mission, and the amendment would enable a new structure for the office to be enacted by ordinance. However, the charter change may not be necessary. Further, it is impossible to judge the potential benefits of the charter change without a companion ordinance. Such an ordinance would ideally have been based on a comprehensive analysis of Police Monitor offices nationwide, including the appropriateness of the permanent tax dedication. If the amendment passes, the City should immediately undertake a best practices study and craft the missing ordinance based on its findings.”

Review Board therefore lacks independence from the OIG.

This is incorrect. Under the current charter, the “OIG, in conjunction with the Ethics Review Board, shall receive an annual appropriation from the Council in an amount not less than 0.75% of the General Fund operating budget. . . . Of the budget percentage specified in this paragraph, an amount shall be allocated for the operation of the Ethics Review Board adequate to implement its functions efficiently and effectively.”³⁷ In practice, the OIG and Ethics Review Board have agreed to negotiate the allocation of dedicated funds between the entities each year.³⁸ The immediate past Ethics Review Board chairman told BGR there has been no difficulty with this process, despite personnel changes in the OIG and in board membership over time. He also told BGR that any Inspector General attempting to undermine the board’s budget would be subject to dismissal.

Proponents support the charter amendment because it seeks to permanently divide the dedicated funding among the three ethics entities. However, while the amendment would guarantee a specific percentage of the general fund to each ethics entity, it would also diminish flexibility in allocations among them.³⁹

As BGR has pointed out in the past, permanently dedicated funding can lead to outsized budgets and large surpluses.⁴⁰

Furthermore, guaranteed funding raises accountability issues by allowing funding to remain divided along the same lines regardless of results. This problem is magnified for the Police Monitor by the uncertainty as to who will oversee the office.

Finally, separating the two offices creates the potential for operational inefficiencies. They are now operating at two separate locations under separate leases. The public has al-

ready incurred some such costs; in 2015, the Ethics Review Board transferred \$92,500 in excess funds⁴¹ to the Police Monitor to fund relocation expenses. On the other hand, as previously discussed, the Police Monitor’s relocation established an office that the Police Monitor Division believes is more accessible and inviting to citizens and police officers who want to meet with the Police Monitor.

Is a Charter Amendment Appropriate?

The OIG’s prior attempt to use existing remedies to resolve the conflict with the Police Monitor resulted in public disagreements and reduced productivity. The charter amendment would shield those two particular entities from the future possibility of a similar scenario. However, this charter amendment risks setting a precedent for elevating matters such as this to charter-level concerns.

BGR POSITION

NO POSITION. The Police Monitor has an important mission, and the amendment would enable a new structure for the office to be enacted by ordinance. However, the charter change may not be necessary. Further, it is impossible to judge the potential benefits of the charter change without a companion ordinance. Such an ordinance would ideally have been based on a comprehensive analysis of Police Monitor offices nationwide, including the appropriateness of the permanent tax dedication. If the amendment passes, the City should immediately undertake a best practices study and craft the missing ordinance based on its findings.

ENDNOTES

- 1 New Orleans City Council Ord. Cal. No. 31,019, adopted November 19, 2015.
- 2 Home Rule Charter of the City of New Orleans, Sec. 9-401 and 9-402.
- 3 *Ibid.*, Sec. 9-401(2).
- 4 *Ibid.*, Sec. 9-401(3). See also Supplemental and Amended Memorandum of Understanding between the Ethics Review Board and the Office of Inspector General, December 12, 2012. Each year, the OIG and Ethics Review Board agree on a shared allocation and distribute the funds accordingly.
- 5 The proposed amendment would expand the charter definition of the Police Monitor’s scope of work to capture duties currently defined by ordinance: “The Office of Independent Police Monitor shall also review and analyze the numbers and types of complaints; assess the quality and timeliness of New Orleans Police Department investigations; review the adequacy of data collection and analysis; review the New Orleans Police Department Public Integrity Bureau’s policies, procedures, and resource needs; conduct risk management reviews; review the operations and effectiveness of New Orleans Police Department ‘early warning system’; review specific issues regarding supervision, training, and discipline; and conduct relevant pattern analysis.”
- 6 City of New Orleans, Code of Ordinances, Sec. 2-1121.
- 7 Bureau of Governmental Research, *On the Ballot: New Orleans, October 2008*, pp. 7-8.
- 8 Home Rule Charter of the City of New Orleans, Sec. 9-401(2).
- 9 New Orleans City Council, Ord. 27,032 M.C.S, adopted July 10, 2008.
- 10 City of New Orleans Code of Ordinances, Sec. 2-1121.
- 11 *Ibid.*, Sec. 2-1121(1). The ordinance states that “the inspector general shall create a search committee to be composed of the inspector general, serving as committee chair, the chair of the ethics review board, the chair of the criminal justice committee of the city council, the superintendent of police or his designee, a designee of the mayor, and two residents of New Orleans appointed by a vote of the criminal justice committee of the city council. The search committee shall carry on a nationwide search to identify and interview qualified candidates for the position.”
- 12 *Ibid.*, Sec. 2-1121(20).
- 13 Letter from E.R. Quatrevaux, Inspector General, to the Ethics Review Board (September 15, 2015).
- 14 Letter from Susan Hutson, Independent Police Monitor, to the Ethics Review Board (October 1, 2015).
- 15 Press Statement, Office of Independent Police Monitor, Police Monitor Susan Hutson’s Response to Inspector General’s Recommendation for Termination (October 1, 2015).
- 16 Agreement for Funding, Ordinance Change, and Charter Amendment, Office of Inspector General (OIG) and Office of Independent Police Monitor (OIPM), October 14, 2015. See also New Orleans City Council, Res. No. R-15-507, adopted October 15, 2015.
- 17 Agreement for Funding, Ordinance Change, and Charter Amendment, Office of Inspector General (OIG) and Office of Independent Police Monitor (OIPM), October 14, 2015.
- 18 *Ibid.*
- 19 *Ibid.* One observer has suggested that this agreement may run afoul of the charter provision calling for the Police Monitor’s office to be a “division” of the OIG.
- 20 For example, the New York Police Department (NYPD) is overseen by a division of the Department of Investigation, the city’s office of inspector general. The OIG for the NYPD was created to investigate, review, study, audit and make recommendations relating to the operations, policies, programs and practices of the police department. In Portland, Ore., the city auditor oversees the Independent Police Review Division.
- 21 Office of Inspector General, “The New Orleans Police Monitor Model,” concept paper, June 2013.
- 22 New Orleans City Council, Ord. 27,032 M.C.S, adopted July 10, 2008.
- 23 Home Rule Charter of the City of New Orleans, Sec. 3-112.
- 24 City of New Orleans, Code of Ordinances, Sec. 2-1120(16)(b). The peer review is conducted by the Association of Inspectors General, a national organization of which the OIG is a member, and includes an evaluation of the OIG’s work and procedures weighed against nationally accepted standards and best practices. See Letter from Thomas Caulfield, Former Co-Chair, AIG Peer Review Committee, and Executive Board Member, Association of Inspectors General to Edouard R. Quatrevaux, Inspector General for the City of New Orleans, April 6, 2015.
- 25 *Ibid.*, Sec. 2-1120(16)(a). The quality assurance review process reviews and evaluates the OIG’s annual published work product. The mayor, the City Council and the Ethics Review Board each appoint a local citizen to the committee.
- 26 *Ibid.*, Sec. 2-1120(3)(c).

27 BGR's research was guided by a list of civilian oversight agencies throughout the country that are members of the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE). BGR drew from a list of cities that have hired an individual police monitor, police auditor, or executive director of a civilian oversight agency, as opposed to those that function only as an oversight board or body. Specifically, BGR researched the police monitor offices located in Austin, Texas; Chicago; Denver; Eugene and Portland, Ore.; Fresno, Los Angeles, Orange County, Palo Alto, Sacramento, San Francisco and San Jose, Calif.; King County, Wash.; Minneapolis; New York City; Tucson, Ariz.; and Washington, D.C. BGR notes that the Chicago Independent Police Review Authority and the Orange County Office of Independent Review are in the process of restructuring.

28 In New York City, the OIG for the NYPD is appointed by the Commissioner of the Department of Investigation.

29 In Washington, D.C., the executive director of the Office of Citizen Complaint Review is hired by the Citizen Complaint Review Board. The Board is comprised of one member of the Police Department and four members with no affiliation to law enforcement. Board members are appointed by the mayor, subject to Council confirmation, and serve staggered three-year terms.

30 BGR's research found four-year terms imposed in Chicago, King County, Wash., and San Jose, Calif. and a three-year term imposed in Washington, D.C. The executive director of the Orange County Office of Independent Review and the Palo Alto police auditor are subject to a periodic contract renewal process.

31 Employees of the Orange County Office of Independent Review and the Palo Alto Independent Police Auditor office are hired as independent contractors.

32 BGR's research found civilian review boards in Austin, Texas; Chicago; Denver; Eugene and Portland, Ore., King County, Wash.; Los Angeles, Sacramento and San Francisco, Calif.; Minneapolis; New York City; Tucson, Ariz.; and Washington, D.C.

33 The civilian review boards in Denver, Eugene, Ore., and Washington, D.C., review the effectiveness of the police monitor. In Los Angeles, the Board of Police Commissioners serves as the head of the Police Department and also oversees the Office of Inspector General for the Department.

34 BGR's research found that police oversight agencies in Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles, Portland, Ore., and Washington, D.C., have subpoena power.

35 BGR calculation based on City of New Orleans, 2016 Adopted Operating Budget, pp. 48 and 442. The City's general fund for fiscal year 2016 totals \$601.7 million.

36 City of New Orleans Code of Ordinances, Sec. 2-767.

37 Home Rule Charter of the City of New Orleans, Sec. 9-401(3).

38 Supplemental and Amended Memorandum of Understanding between the Ethics Review Board and the Office of Inspector General, December 12, 2012.

39 It should be noted, however, that the proposed amendment would allow the ethics entities to agree between or among themselves to reallocate the dedicated funds.

40 In November 2015, for instance, BGR reported that dedicating a percentage of all Orleans Parish property revenues to the assessor's office allowed that office to amass a surplus equivalent to 110% of its operating budget. See BGR, *The \$1 Billion Question: Do the Tax Dedications in New Orleans Make Sense?* November 2015, p. 15. Under the current charter framework, the OIG and the Ethics Review Board have ended some years with a surplus and returned it to the City for general fund use. The OIG returned approximately \$143,000 in unused funds to the City from 2011 to 2015. Prior to 2011, the OIG returned larger amounts when funding was dedicated for a fully staffed office but all personnel had not been hired yet.

41 According to the Inspector General, the OIG held onto dedicated funding in 2015 during negotiations with the Police Monitor. The OIG said that when the agreement between the OIG and Police Monitor was executed, little time remained in the fiscal year to make additional expenditures, resulting in a larger than usual amount of unused funds.

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ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
MEMORANDUM

TO: STELLA CZIMENT

FROM: SHARONDA R. WILLIAMS

DATE: DECEMBER 1, 2025

RE: PROHIBITIONS ON FUTURE EMPLOYMENT

ISSUES PRESENTED

- A. Can the Ethics Review Board (“ERB”) restrict future employment of the Independent Police Monitor (“IPM”)?
- B. Can the ERB prohibit the Independent Police Monitor from seeking election to public office?

SHORT ANSWER

- A. No.
- B. No.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Post-Employment Prohibitions Are Limited to the Code of Government Ethics, and General Inter-Agency Employment Prohibitions are Impermissible.

i. Louisiana Law

The Louisiana Code of Government Ethics sets forth the post-employment prohibitions affecting a public employee. La. R.S. 42:1121 generally provides that a former municipal agency head or public employee is prohibited for a period of two years after employment from assisting another person, for compensation, in a transaction, or in an appearance in connection with a transaction, involving that agency or render any service on a contractual basis to or for such agency. La. Stat. Ann. § 42:1121. This provision would prohibit the IPM from entering into a contract or assisting another entity with procuring a contract with the Office of Independent Police Monitor (“OIPM”) for a period of two years after employment. It does not prohibit the IPM from seeking employment in another public agency.

An effort by the ERB to restrict future employment of the IPM is tantamount to an effort to impose a non-compete or non-solicitation agreement on a government employee, and Louisiana laws on non-compete and non-solicitation provides strong guidance on this issue.

Louisiana's strong public policy restricting non-compete agreements between employers and employees is based upon an underlying state desire to prevent an individual from contractually depriving himself of the ability to support himself and consequently becoming a public burden. *Deep South Communications, LLC v. Fellegy*, M.D.La.2023, 652 F.Supp.3d 636; *Innovative Manpower Solutions, LLC v. Ironman Staffing, LLC*, W.D.La.2013, 929 F.Supp.2d 597; *Causin, L.L.C. v. Pace Safety Consultants, LLC*, App. 4 Cir.2019, 363 So.3d 421, 2018-0706 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/30/19); *Iberia Financial Services, LLC v. Mitchell*, App. 3 Cir.2020, 299 So.3d 195, 2019-413 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/17/20),

La. Stat. Ann. § 23:921 (A)(1) provides:

A. (1) Every contract or agreement, or provision thereof, by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind, except as provided in this Section, shall be null and void.

La. Stat. Ann. § 23:921. The exceptions to this prohibition as set forth in La. Stat. Ann. § 23:921 (A)(1) include non-compete agreements related to specific professions (e.g. primary care physicians, automobile salesmen, franchisor/franchisee), sale of goodwill of a business, solicitation of customers for a set period of time, engaging in a similar business for a set period of time, or use of confidential computer programs. None of these exceptions would apply to the IPM as the IPM does not operate a business that has goodwill, intellectual property or customer lists¹ that could be used by the IPM in a future position to operate a competitive business.

Under Louisiana law, a covenant not to compete is disfavored, as it may function to deprive a person of his livelihood. *Sentilles Optical Services, Div. Of Senasco, Inc. v. Phillips*, 26,594 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/1/95), 651 So.2d 395. Statutory exceptions to the public policy against anticompetition agreements are tightly drawn and should be narrowly construed in keeping with underlying policy of prohibiting restraint of free competition. *First Page Operating Under the Name and Corporate Entity, Groome Enterprises, Inc. v. Network Paging Corp.*, 628 So.2d 130 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/30/93), writ denied by 93-3193 (La.2/11/94), 634 So.2d 379. *See Aon Risk Servs. of Louisiana, Inc. v. Ryan*, 2001-0614 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/23/02), 807 So. 2d 1058, 1061.

The ERB cannot restrict the IPM from seeking other employment that does not violate the Code of Government Ethics post-employment prohibitions. A blanket inter-agency employment prohibition is not supported by the law and violates Louisiana's strong public policy against an employee contractually depriving herself of the ability to support herself and consequently becoming a public burden.

ii. **Federal law**

Federal laws also provide guidance on this issue. The primary federal statute governing post-employment restrictions, 18 U.S.C. § 207, establishes comprehensive limitations on former government employees but does not generally prohibit inter-agency employment. *See* 18 U.S.C.A. § 207. Like La. R.S. 42:1121, the statute creates several categories of restrictions based on the

¹ Notably, much of the information in the possession of the Office of the Independent Police Monitor would be considered public records that can be accessed by any member of the public who is of the age of majority.

employee's former position and seniority level, ranging from permanent prohibitions on certain representational activities to temporary restrictions lasting one to two years.

While categorical prohibitions on inter-agency employment are generally impermissible, agencies may impose specific restrictions in limited circumstances. These include situations involving security clearances, conflicts of interest, or employee misconduct. However, such restrictions must be tailored to address specific legitimate government interests and cannot constitute blanket prohibitions on government employment.

Recent litigation demonstrates the constitutional limits on broad employment restrictions. In *Perkins Coie LLP v. U.S. Department of Justice*, a federal district court addressed Executive Order 14230, which required federal agencies to "refrain from hiring employees of Perkins Coie, absent a waiver." *Perkins Coie LLP v. U.S. Department of Justice*, 783 F.Supp.3d 105 (2025). The court characterized this as "a virtual government hiring ban" and noted that "the government offers absolutely no justification, let alone any legitimate government interest for this government action imposing such a sweeping hiring ban." *Perkins Coie*, 783 F.Supp.3d at 162.

The Supreme Court has established that government employment decisions must balance the employee's constitutional rights against the government's interests as an employer. In *Waters v. Churchill*, the Court emphasized that "constitutional review of government employment decisions must rest on different principles than review of speech restraints imposed by the government as sovereign." *See Waters v. Churchill*, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994). The government has broader authority when acting as an employer than when acting as a sovereign, but this authority is not unlimited.

The Court in *Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture* clarified that courts must consider "whether the asserted employee right implicates the basic concerns of the relevant constitutional provision, or whether the claimed right can more readily give way to the requirements of the government as employer." *See Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr.*, 553 U.S. 591, 600 (2008). This framework recognizes that, while government employees accept certain limitations on their freedom, they retain fundamental constitutional protections that cannot be bargained away through employment contracts. *See Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri*, 564 U.S. 379, 386 (2011).

Federal employees enjoy equal protection and due process protections that limit arbitrary employment restrictions. The Supreme Court has recognized that government employees have protected interests in their employment that cannot be arbitrarily denied. In cases involving employment restrictions, courts apply constitutional scrutiny to ensure that any limitations serve legitimate government interests and are not imposed in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.

The Fifth Circuit's decision in *Phillips v. Vandygriff* established that when informal agency practices effectively create employment prerequisites, applicants have "protectable interest in not being arbitrarily or discriminatorily denied opportunity to practice his profession" and "must be granted due process protections necessary to uphold that interest." *Phillips v. Vandygriff*, 724 F.2d 490, 493 (1984). This principle extends to situations where government agencies attempt to restrict employment opportunities across the federal system.

In short, under federal law, government employees have post-employment restrictions related to 18 U.S.C. § 207 (like restrictions set forth in La. R.S. 42:42:1121), and any further attempts to restrict inter-agency employment is subject to constitutional protections.

Any attempt to restrict the IPM, while other public employees in municipal government are not subject to similar prohibitions, would violate constitutional protections. Further, prohibitions on inter-agency employment are generally impermissible.

B. Post-Employment Restrictions on Seeking Elected Office are Prohibited.

The Louisiana constitution sets forth the prohibitions against political activity or seeking elected office. La. Const. Ann. art. X, § 9 provides:

No member of a civil service commission and no officer or employee in the classified service shall participate or engage in political activity; be a candidate for nomination or election to public office except to seek election as the classified state employee serving on the State Civil Service Commission; or be a member of any national, state, or local committee of a political party or faction; make or solicit contributions for any political party, faction, or candidate; or take active part in the management of the affairs of a political party, faction, candidate, or any political campaign, except to exercise his right as a citizen to express his opinion privately, to serve as a commissioner or official watcher at the polls, and to cast his vote as he desires.

La. Const. Ann. art. X, § 9. Similarly, La. Stat. Ann. § 33:2429(C) expressly states “[n]o person elected to public office shall, during the term for which he was elected, be appointed to any position in the classified service.” None of these prohibitions related to running for office in Louisiana apply to the IPM (an unclassified employee) or any actions of the IPM post-employment.

Other than these provisions of law that specifically relate to classified employees, Louisiana law expressly prohibits an employer from restricting an employee from becoming a candidate for public office or participating in politics. La. Stat. Ann. § 23:961 provides:

Except as otherwise provided in R.S. 23:962, no employer having regularly in his employ twenty or more employees shall make, adopt, or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy forbidding or preventing any of his employees from engaging or participating in politics, or from becoming a candidate for public office. No such employer shall adopt or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy which will control, direct, or tend to control or direct the political activities or affiliations of his employees, nor coerce or influence, or attempt to coerce or influence any of his employees by means of threats of discharge or of loss of employment in case such employees should support or become affiliated with any particular political faction or organization, or participate in political activities of any nature or character.

La. Stat. Ann. § 23:961. If an employer violates this law, the violating employer is subject to a fine and/or imprisonment. Further, an employee injured by a violation of this law may recover damages against the employer.

In *Davis v. Louisiana Computing Corp.*, 394 So. 2d 678, 679 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 400 So. 2d 668 (La. 1981), the plaintiff by his candidacy made himself a detriment to his employer and was “disloyal” to his employer. But the court reasoned that the policy of the statute is unmistakable: the employer may not control political candidacy of his employees. There was no exemption from the legislative purpose because of the nature of the employer's business. The plaintiff was awarded damages when he was fired by the employer.

The law simply does not allow a policy prohibiting a current employee from running for office. Without question, an employer cannot prohibit a *former* employee from running for office.

Courts have held that the right to run for public office is not a fundamental right, but is an important right. *Bullock v. Carter*, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972); *Magill v. Lynch*, 560 F.2d 22 (1st Cir.1977); *Hickman v. City of Dallas*, 475 F.Supp. 137 (N.D.Tex.1979). Restrictions on that right are constitutionally permissible where the government entity impairing the right shows that the strictures placed on the ability to run for office are reasonably necessary to achieve a compelling public objective. *Morial v. Judiciary Commission*, 565 F.2d 295, 300 (5th Cir.1977) (*en banc*) cert. denied 435 U.S. 1013, 98 S.Ct. 1887, 56 L.Ed.2d 395 (1978). Thus, the ERB must demonstrate (1) that the “ends” of the challenged regulations are compelling and (2) that the “means” are reasonably necessary in order to justify impairing plaintiffs' First Amendment right. *Segars v. Fulton Cnty., Ga.*, 644 F. Supp. 682, 685 (N.D. Ga. 1986).

Cases that have applied this constitutional analysis have dealt with current public employees—not former employees---and whether their candidacy would create a conflict or allow for an overlap of jurisdictional authority between employment and candidacy or elected office. None of those considerations could be present after the IPM has ceased serving in that role. Any future role as an elected official or a candidate for elected office would not cause a conflict or jurisdictional overlap if the IPM is no longer serving in that role.