

2016 Crisis Intervention Team Annual Report

f) NOPD shall track CIT use through data provided by the CIT officer or MCTU after each response. NOPD shall gather and track the following data at a minimum:

- (1) Data, time, and location of the incident;
- (2) Subject's name, age, gender, and address;
- (3) Whether the subject was armed, and type of weapon;
- (4) Whether the subject is a U.S. military veteran;
- (5) Complainant's name and address;
- (6) Name and badge number of CIT officer on the scene;
- (7) Whether a supervisor responded to the scene;
- (8) Techniques or equipment used;
- (9) Any injuries to officers, subject, or others;
- (10) Disposition; and
- (11) Brief narrative of the event (if not included in any other document).

g) NOPD shall publicly report this data, aggregated as necessary to protect privacy.

[Consent Decree ¶113]

The Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) model is a nationally recognized 'best practices' approach in recognizing and managing behavior that may be attributable to a mental health disorder. Under this program, specially chosen officers receive 40 hours of intense training from mental health experts focused on techniques and best practices for minimizing the use of force against individuals in crisis due to mental illness or a behavioral disorder. CIT officers are assigned to each police district and are trained to respond to and de-escalate mental health crises.

The Crisis Intervention Team certified 77 officers in three classes in 2016, bringing the total number of CIT officers across the department to 122 by the end of 2016. All officers certified in 2015 received an 8-hour "refresher" course and/or an 8-hour CIT core in-service course to maintain their CIT certification. NOPD dispatches these specially trained CIT officers to crisis calls when available to utilize their certified CIT skills to de-escalate crisis situations.

All officers, CIT-certified and non-certified, received a foundational 8-hour course on crisis intervention and de-escalation during core in-service. In collaboration with the Orleans Parish Communications District, 69 911 dispatchers were trained in 2016.


The NOPD policy on Crisis Intervention (Chapter 41.25) went into effect in March 2016. The Department then began gathering the data enumerated in ¶ 113. Between March and December 2016, officers submitted 2,784 incidents via the crisis intervention form. Aggregated data are included in this report.

Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) Data

NOPD utilizes a Computer Automated Dispatch (CAD) system to track calls for service. The calls are tagged with an initial signal code and a final signal code categorizing the incident. The initial signal code is that entered by the dispatcher based on the caller's description of the situation. When an officer responds to the call for service, s/he may update the signal code based on observations or information available at the scene; this is the final signal code. Data below include crisis calls for service, where either the initial or final signal codes were 103M (Disturbance, Mental) or 27-29S (Attempted Suicide). NOPD recognizes that crises impact calls classified under other signal classifications but does not have a mechanism to capture this impact currently.


NOPD received a total of 6,517 crisis calls for service in 2016 for which the initial or final signal was 103M (Disturbance, Mental) or 27-29S (Attempted Suicide). Calls by month ranged from a low of 443 in February to a high of 589 in May.

Figure 01 - Crisis Calls for Service by Month




The greatest number of crisis calls for service was in the 7th District, which is geographically the largest district in New Orleans. The smallest number of calls was in the 8th District, which is geographically the smallest district in New Orleans.

Figure 02 - Total Crisis Calls for Service by District




On average, NOPD received 18 crisis calls for service per day.

Figure 03 - Average Crisis Calls for Service per Day by District




The majority of incidents took place during A Platoon (6:25am – 3:00pm) and B Platoon (2:25pm – 11:00pm), with a minority occurring during C Platoon (10:25pm – 7:00am).

Figure 04 - Crisis Calls for Service by Platoon



Nearly three-quarters of crisis calls for service were for emergency situations (code 2 dispatch).

Figure 05 - Crisis Calls for Service by Emergency Level




Crisis Intervention Form Aggregate Data

The following figures present aggregate data compiled from crisis intervention forms which are completed at the conclusion of crisis calls for service with a final classification of 103M (Disturbance, Mental). NOPD began completing crisis intervention forms when Chapter 41.25 – Crisis Intervention took effect on March 13, 2016. Officers complete crisis intervention forms on all calls with a final classification of 103M (Disturbance, Mental) but may not submit a crisis intervention form on calls that may involve a crisis but are not classified as a 103M (Disturbance, Mental). For example, if an officer arrests an individual in crisis for a battery, the officer may not complete a crisis intervention form, so the data for that incident may not be captured in this information.


Incidents were spread fairly evenly throughout the week, with a slightly lower percentage on weekend days.

Figure 06 - Incidents by Day of Week




The majority of persons in crisis were adults between the ages of 18 and 69, while roughly 12% were under 18 and roughly 3% were over 70 years of age.

Figure 07 - Incidents by Age of Person in Crisis




The ratio of male to female persons in crisis was roughly 3:2.

Figure 08 - Incidents by Sex of Person in Crisis




Nearly three-quarters of incidents involved persons in crisis who were black, while one quarter were white and the remaining percentages identified as Asian, Hispanic, or another race.

Figure 09 - Incidents by Race of Person in Crisis




The majority of persons in crisis were residents of Orleans Parish, while 7% resided in other parishes or states, and a 6.4% had no fixed place of residence.

Figure 10 - Incidents by Residence of Person in Crisis




More than 95% of persons in crisis were unarmed.

Figure 11 - Incidents by Weapon in Possession of Person in Crisis




Roughly 5% of persons in crisis identified as veterans; the status of 16% of persons in crisis was unknown, while the remainder were non-veterans.

Figure 12 - Incidents by Veteran Status of Person in Crisis




More than 95% of complainants (those who called or flagged down police officers to respond to a disturbance) resided in Orleans Parish.

Figure 13 - Incidents by Residence of Complainant




Roughly three-quarters of incidents concluded with either voluntary or involuntary commitment to a psychiatric hospital for the person in crisis. The low percentage of arrests and summonses is partially attributable to the nature of crisis intervention form reporting. Officers complete crisis intervention forms on all calls with a final classification of 103M (Disturbance, Mental) but may not submit a crisis intervention form on calls that may involve a crisis but are not classified as a 103M (Disturbance, Mental). For example, if an officer arrests an individual in crisis for a battery, the officer may not complete a crisis intervention form, so the arrest of a person in crisis may not be captured. The Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office reports that in an average month during 2016, the jail housed roughly 1600 individuals and conducted 300 general mental health counseling sessions.

Figure 14 - Incidents by Disposition


94.6% of persons in crisis did not sustain injuries in the course of the call for service. 5.1% of individuals in crisis were injured prior to the arrival of the officers on the scene, and 0.4% were injured after police arrival.

Figure 15 - Injuries to Person in Crisis



Officers sustained injuries in 0.5% of interactions with persons in crisis.

Figure 16 - Injuries to Officers



In 97% of instances, officers attempted verbalization before utilizing handcuffs or other restraints. In slightly more than half of interactions, officers applied handcuffs due to a safety or flight risk or to facilitate safe transportation of the person in crisis. Techniques involving less-lethal force were utilized in 0.4% of cases.

Figure 17 - Techniques Used

